Gavin Andresen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2011-09-26 🗒️ Summary of this message: Gavin Andresen ...
📅 Original date posted:2011-09-26
🗒️ Summary of this message: Gavin Andresen discusses the potential for DoS attacks on Bitcoin nodes and the importance of updating to avoid obsolete clients and non-majority block chains.
📝 Original message:On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 3:17 PM, Luke-Jr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> + return DoS(10, error("AcceptToMemoryPool() : transaction with out-of-
> bounds SigOpCount"));
> + return DoS(10, error("ConnectInputs() : tried to
> spend coinbase at depth %d", pindexBlock->nHeight - pindex->nHeight));
> These shouldn't be "DoS"'d, or else you open a new DoS when nodes legitimately
> relay such transactions/blocks.
Huh?
So in the future lets suppose we schedule a change to the acceptable
block rules that allows more SigOps in a block, or allows generation
transaction to be spent before 100 confirmations. At that same time,
the DoS rules will be changed.
You cannot "legitimately" relay those blocks without a scheduled
block-chain-split. If a block-chain-split IS scheduled and the rules
change, then denying service to nodes running old, obsolete versions
of bitcoin is the right thing to do-- it is better to "fail hard" and
find it difficult or impossible to connect to the network rather than
continue with an obsolete client and a non-majority block chain.
(and the third DoS in AcceptBlock(): prev block not found is a
"should be impossible" case, because AcceptBlock is only called when
extending the best-block chain).
--
--
Gavin Andresen
🗒️ Summary of this message: Gavin Andresen discusses the potential for DoS attacks on Bitcoin nodes and the importance of updating to avoid obsolete clients and non-majority block chains.
📝 Original message:On Mon, Sep 26, 2011 at 3:17 PM, Luke-Jr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> + return DoS(10, error("AcceptToMemoryPool() : transaction with out-of-
> bounds SigOpCount"));
> + return DoS(10, error("ConnectInputs() : tried to
> spend coinbase at depth %d", pindexBlock->nHeight - pindex->nHeight));
> These shouldn't be "DoS"'d, or else you open a new DoS when nodes legitimately
> relay such transactions/blocks.
Huh?
So in the future lets suppose we schedule a change to the acceptable
block rules that allows more SigOps in a block, or allows generation
transaction to be spent before 100 confirmations. At that same time,
the DoS rules will be changed.
You cannot "legitimately" relay those blocks without a scheduled
block-chain-split. If a block-chain-split IS scheduled and the rules
change, then denying service to nodes running old, obsolete versions
of bitcoin is the right thing to do-- it is better to "fail hard" and
find it difficult or impossible to connect to the network rather than
continue with an obsolete client and a non-majority block chain.
(and the third DoS in AcceptBlock(): prev block not found is a
"should be impossible" case, because AcceptBlock is only called when
extending the best-block chain).
--
--
Gavin Andresen