Joost Jager [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2020-10-23 📝 Original message: Hi Bastien, We add a ...
📅 Original date posted:2020-10-23
📝 Original message:
Hi Bastien,
We add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid
> unconditionally when offering an HTLC.
> We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when
> receiving an HTLC, but refunded
> if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes
> about this).
>
It is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively
independent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment
could quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said,
just transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the
offerer to the receiver.
I am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I
agree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be
enough.
Maybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make
5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be
willing to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor.
Suppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should
the fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still
earn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both
the controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario?
- Joost
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📝 Original message:
Hi Bastien,
We add a forward upfront payment of 1 msat (fixed) that is paid
> unconditionally when offering an HTLC.
> We add a backwards upfront payment of `hold_fees` that is paid when
> receiving an HTLC, but refunded
> if the HTLC is settled before the `hold_grace_period` ends (see footnotes
> about this).
>
It is interesting that the forward and backward payments are relatively
independent of each other. In particular the forward anti-spam payment
could quite easily be implemented to help protect the network. As you said,
just transfer that fixed fee for every `update_add_htlc` message from the
offerer to the receiver.
I am wondering though what the values for the fwd and bwd fees should be. I
agree with ZmnSCPxj that 1 msat for the fwd is probably not going to be
enough.
Maybe a way to approach it is this: suppose routing nodes are able to make
5% per year on their committed capital. An aggressive routing node could be
willing to spend up to that amount to take down a competitor.
Suppose the network consists only of 1 BTC, 483 slot channels. What should
the fwd and bwd fees be so that even an attacked routing node will still
earn that 5% (not through forwarding fees, but through hold fees) in both
the controlled and the uncontrolled spam scenario?
- Joost
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