Jeff Garzik [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2013-06-04 📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2013-06-04
📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 10:55 AM, John Dillon
<john.dillon892 at googlemail.com> wrote:
>> I'm one of the people experimenting in this area. I've long argued
>> that a zero-output transaction should be permitted -- 100% miner fee
>> -- as an elegant proof of sacrifice. Unfortunately that requires a
>> hard fork. Also, for most people, it seems likely that a change
>> transaction would be generated. That, then, would generate an
>> already-standard transaction, where inputs > outputs.
>
> 100% miner fee is not a proof of anything because the miner could have created
> that transaction for themselves. You must have proof that all miners had an
> equal opportunity at collecting the fee, and the only way to do that is by
> Peter's announce-commit protocol, or his unspendable until after n blocks
> proposal.
Absolutely. It wholly depends on the security model, and
economic-incentives model. Some use models simply don't care if the
miner created a transaction that gave the fee to themselves. It might
even be /encouraged/ to do this! Sure they are paying themselves, but
given bitcoin network difficulty is so high, simply obtaining
payments-go-myself-as-miner transactions is itself difficult.
Producing an identity (my goal) or whatever is just fine, and in such
case becomes simply an additional block reward -- an additional
incentive to buy into this identity creation/management system.
Or exchange "identity" with another token, for another data service of
your choice.
This is no longer a strict "proof of sacrifice" system, if such
behavior is encouraged, but it is nonetheless valid.
--
Jeff Garzik
Senior Software Engineer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc. https://bitpay.com/
📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 10:55 AM, John Dillon
<john.dillon892 at googlemail.com> wrote:
>> I'm one of the people experimenting in this area. I've long argued
>> that a zero-output transaction should be permitted -- 100% miner fee
>> -- as an elegant proof of sacrifice. Unfortunately that requires a
>> hard fork. Also, for most people, it seems likely that a change
>> transaction would be generated. That, then, would generate an
>> already-standard transaction, where inputs > outputs.
>
> 100% miner fee is not a proof of anything because the miner could have created
> that transaction for themselves. You must have proof that all miners had an
> equal opportunity at collecting the fee, and the only way to do that is by
> Peter's announce-commit protocol, or his unspendable until after n blocks
> proposal.
Absolutely. It wholly depends on the security model, and
economic-incentives model. Some use models simply don't care if the
miner created a transaction that gave the fee to themselves. It might
even be /encouraged/ to do this! Sure they are paying themselves, but
given bitcoin network difficulty is so high, simply obtaining
payments-go-myself-as-miner transactions is itself difficult.
Producing an identity (my goal) or whatever is just fine, and in such
case becomes simply an additional block reward -- an additional
incentive to buy into this identity creation/management system.
Or exchange "identity" with another token, for another data service of
your choice.
This is no longer a strict "proof of sacrifice" system, if such
behavior is encouraged, but it is nonetheless valid.
--
Jeff Garzik
Senior Software Engineer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc. https://bitpay.com/