Jeremy Rubin [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-04-21 📝 Original message:I think I've discussed ...

📅 Original date posted:2022-04-21
📝 Original message:I think I've discussed this type of concept previously somewhere but cannot
find a link to where.

Largely, I think the following:

1) This doesn't reduce burden of maintenance and risk of consensus split,
it raises it:
A) as we now have a bunch of tricky code around reorgs and mempool
around the time of rule de-activation.
B) we need to permanently maintain the rule to validate old blocks fully
2) Most of the value of a 'temporary soft fork' is more safely captured by
use of a CTV emulation server / servers, which has a more graceful
degradation property of the servers simply shutting down and not
authorizing new contracts, but funds not being vulnerable to theft. The
model here is trust, as opposed to a timeout.
2A) The way I implemented the oracles in CTV was such that, if we wanted
to, we could actually soft-fork the rules for the oracle's keys such that
they would *have to* only sign CTV-valid transactions (e.g., the keys could
be made public). Pretty weird model, but cool that it would enable
after-the-fact trust model improvements. This could be generalized for any
opcode to be emulator -> emulator consensus guaranteed -> non signature
based opcode.

Although I will note that I like the spirit of this, and encourage thinking
more creatively about other ways to have temporary forks in Bitcoin like
this.

Best,

Jeremy

--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
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