📅 Original date posted:2015-09-03 📝 Original message:Jeff Garzik via ...

jl2012 at xbt.hk [ARCHIVE] /

npub1kc0…jfw4

2023-06-07 17:39:25

in reply to nevent1q…9m29

📅 Original date posted:2015-09-03
📝 Original message:Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-09-03 00:05 寫到:
> Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block
> size should be avoided. The miners incentive has always been fairly
> straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as
> you can get it online. Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring
> out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners
> to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both
> unrealistic and potentially corrosive. That potentially makes the
> block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to
> the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.
>
> Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth
> researching.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

Ref:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010723.html

I explained here why pay with difficulty is bad for everyone: miners and
users, and described the use of OP_CLTV for pay-to-future-miner

However, a general problem of pay-to-increase-block-size scheme is it
indirectly sets a minimal tx fee, which could be difficult and
arbitrary, and is against competition

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npub1kc0zulxt7j4a0ayhzhrz7jk84y7tm4026qcky7w97hlfkxxap24qnwjfw4

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2023-06-07 17:39:25

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