Erik Aronesty [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2018-09-11 📝 Original message:To answer points: - I ...
📅 Original date posted:2018-09-11
📝 Original message:To answer points:
- I switched to the medium article so that I could correct, edit and
improve things to make them more clear.
- I responded to feedback by modifying the protocol to make it work - not
by ignoring it.
- I coded it up in python so I could be sure it worked, because I was
concerned that it was broken
- Yes, coding it up showed me that it's definitely interactive, and no
different than a "standard shnorr sig" in any meaningful way regarding the
security
- No special protocol support is needed over Schnorr signing itself. The
e, s version can be made at least as secure as schnorr + DLP. I haven't
researched the R,s version.
- An M-1 rogue-key attack would require the attacker would to either
- attack the hash function to produce a predictable R based on a known
mesage
- attack the DLP to influence x or k
Neither attack gives any particular advantage to someone who has M-1 keys.
I haven't tested whether the R,s version is susceptible though.
On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 9:15 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 1:49 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Detailed explanation with code snippets:
> >
> > https://medium.com/@simulx/an-m-of-n-bitcoin-multisig-scheme-[snip]
>
> This appears to be a repost of the broken scheme you posted about on
> Bitcointalk, but then failed to respond to the response.
>
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4973123.0
>
> > The more I look into it and speak to professors about i, the more it
> seems "so trivial nobody really talks about it".
>
> I think you might be falling into the trap of ignoring feedback you
> don't like and and accepting that which sounds like "yea yea,
> something like that".
>
> Something "like that" does work: and is expressly and explicitly
> anticipated by the BIP but to be both secure and functional requires
> proper delineation (E.g. musig) _and_ interaction. What you're
> proposing is continually vague. My best efforts at making sense of
> what you've written indicate that either it's non-interactive and
> not-actually functional at all, OR it's interactive and just a less
> secure subset (no proper delinearization to prevent rogue key attacks)
> of what we already propose.
>
> When Poelstra suggests a CAS implementation he means something like
> this Sage notebook: http://bitcoin.ninja/secp256k1.ecdsa.sage This
> provides for a method of communicating in both directions which is
> completely precise.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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📝 Original message:To answer points:
- I switched to the medium article so that I could correct, edit and
improve things to make them more clear.
- I responded to feedback by modifying the protocol to make it work - not
by ignoring it.
- I coded it up in python so I could be sure it worked, because I was
concerned that it was broken
- Yes, coding it up showed me that it's definitely interactive, and no
different than a "standard shnorr sig" in any meaningful way regarding the
security
- No special protocol support is needed over Schnorr signing itself. The
e, s version can be made at least as secure as schnorr + DLP. I haven't
researched the R,s version.
- An M-1 rogue-key attack would require the attacker would to either
- attack the hash function to produce a predictable R based on a known
mesage
- attack the DLP to influence x or k
Neither attack gives any particular advantage to someone who has M-1 keys.
I haven't tested whether the R,s version is susceptible though.
On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 9:15 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 1:49 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > Detailed explanation with code snippets:
> >
> > https://medium.com/@simulx/an-m-of-n-bitcoin-multisig-scheme-[snip]
>
> This appears to be a repost of the broken scheme you posted about on
> Bitcointalk, but then failed to respond to the response.
>
> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4973123.0
>
> > The more I look into it and speak to professors about i, the more it
> seems "so trivial nobody really talks about it".
>
> I think you might be falling into the trap of ignoring feedback you
> don't like and and accepting that which sounds like "yea yea,
> something like that".
>
> Something "like that" does work: and is expressly and explicitly
> anticipated by the BIP but to be both secure and functional requires
> proper delineation (E.g. musig) _and_ interaction. What you're
> proposing is continually vague. My best efforts at making sense of
> what you've written indicate that either it's non-interactive and
> not-actually functional at all, OR it's interactive and just a less
> secure subset (no proper delinearization to prevent rogue key attacks)
> of what we already propose.
>
> When Poelstra suggests a CAS implementation he means something like
> this Sage notebook: http://bitcoin.ninja/secp256k1.ecdsa.sage This
> provides for a method of communicating in both directions which is
> completely precise.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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