Douglas Huff [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2011-08-24 🗒️ Summary of this message: Discussion on ...
📅 Original date posted:2011-08-24
🗒️ Summary of this message: Discussion on adding an RSA-like scheme for m-out-of-n signatures to Bitcoin. However, it does not solve the issue of malware on a PC. Proposed solution is to provide tools for offline wallets.
📝 Original message:On Aug 24, 2011 3:29 PM, "Gregory Maxwell" <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:05 PM, Christian Decker
> <decker.christian at gmail.com> wrote:
> > we could add an rsa-like scheme which allows m-out-of-n signatures. It
works
> > by distributing shares of the key which are points on a curve having the
> > actual key as 0-value. It does not require special length for the key so
if
> > ecdsa allows something similar there need not be anything changed.
>
> This works fine for ECC. But it requires that the composite key
> signer has simultaneous access to all the key-parts, so it doesn't
> solve the "my PC has malware" problem.
I don't think anything simple enough to actually be used by people in
general does. Same concept as what I proposed earlier before nanotube gave
me the context for Gavin's intent on irc.
Now that I'm understanding the use case I really think the best way to go
about this initially is like you said earlier.
Provide methods to export/import unsigned txns, provide methods to run the
GUI in a way that can track your own addresses with only pubkeys available
to the client, provide methods to sign and import/export/broadcast signed
txns.
With these tools offline wallets become feasible. Combined with wallet
crypto I think this is really the best that can be done to protect users
from themselves in a way that isn't too complicated for them to actually
use.
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🗒️ Summary of this message: Discussion on adding an RSA-like scheme for m-out-of-n signatures to Bitcoin. However, it does not solve the issue of malware on a PC. Proposed solution is to provide tools for offline wallets.
📝 Original message:On Aug 24, 2011 3:29 PM, "Gregory Maxwell" <gmaxwell at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 3:05 PM, Christian Decker
> <decker.christian at gmail.com> wrote:
> > we could add an rsa-like scheme which allows m-out-of-n signatures. It
works
> > by distributing shares of the key which are points on a curve having the
> > actual key as 0-value. It does not require special length for the key so
if
> > ecdsa allows something similar there need not be anything changed.
>
> This works fine for ECC. But it requires that the composite key
> signer has simultaneous access to all the key-parts, so it doesn't
> solve the "my PC has malware" problem.
I don't think anything simple enough to actually be used by people in
general does. Same concept as what I proposed earlier before nanotube gave
me the context for Gavin's intent on irc.
Now that I'm understanding the use case I really think the best way to go
about this initially is like you said earlier.
Provide methods to export/import unsigned txns, provide methods to run the
GUI in a way that can track your own addresses with only pubkeys available
to the client, provide methods to sign and import/export/broadcast signed
txns.
With these tools offline wallets become feasible. Combined with wallet
crypto I think this is really the best that can be done to protect users
from themselves in a way that isn't too complicated for them to actually
use.
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