Matt Corallo [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-08-29 📝 Original message:I believe it was pointed ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-08-29
📝 Original message:I believe it was pointed out previously in the discussion of the Peter R
paper, but I'll repeat it here so that its visible - this seems to
ignore the effects of transaction validation caches and block
compression protocols. Many large miners already have their own network
to relay blocks around the globe with only a few bytes on the wire at
block-time, and there is also the bitcoinrelaynetwork.org network, which
does the same for smaller miners, albeit with slightly less efficiency.
Also, transaction validation time upon receiving a block can be rather
easily made negligible (ie the only validation time you should have is
the DB modify-utxo-set time). Thus, the increased orphan risk for
including a transaction can be reduced to a very, very tiny amount,
making the optimal blocksize, essentially, including everything that
you're confident is in the mempool of other reasonably large miners.
Matt
On 08/29/15 16:43, Daniele Pinna via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I'd like to submit this paper to the dev-list which analyzes how miner
> advantages scale with network and mempool properties in a scenario of
> uncapped block sizes. The work proceeds, in a sense, from where Peter
> R's work left off correcting a mistake and addressing the critiques made
> by the community to his work.
>
> The main result of the work is a detailed analysis of mining advantages
> (defined as the added profit per unit of hash) as a function of miner
> hashrate. In it, I show how large block subsidies (or better, low
> mempool fees-to-subsidy ratios) incentivize the pooling of large
> hashrates due to the steady increasing of marginal profits as hashrates
> grow.
>
> The paper also shows that part of the large advantage the large miners
> have today is due to there being a barrier to entry into a
> high-efficiency mining class which has access to expected profits an
> order of magnitude larger than everyone else. As block subsidies
> decrease, this high-efficiency class is expected to vanish leading to a
> marginal profit structure which decreases as a function of hashrate.
>
> This work has vacuumed my entire life for the past two weeks leading me
> to lag behind on a lot of work. I apologize for typos which I may not
> have seen. I stand by for any comments the community may have and look
> forward to reigniting consideration of a block size scaling proposal
> (BIP101) which, due to the XT fork drama, I believe has been placed
> hastily and undeservedly on the chopping block.
>
> https://www.scribd.com/doc/276849939/On-the-Nature-of-Miner-Advantages-in-Uncapped-Block-Size-Fee-Markets
>
>
> Regards,
> Daniele
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
📝 Original message:I believe it was pointed out previously in the discussion of the Peter R
paper, but I'll repeat it here so that its visible - this seems to
ignore the effects of transaction validation caches and block
compression protocols. Many large miners already have their own network
to relay blocks around the globe with only a few bytes on the wire at
block-time, and there is also the bitcoinrelaynetwork.org network, which
does the same for smaller miners, albeit with slightly less efficiency.
Also, transaction validation time upon receiving a block can be rather
easily made negligible (ie the only validation time you should have is
the DB modify-utxo-set time). Thus, the increased orphan risk for
including a transaction can be reduced to a very, very tiny amount,
making the optimal blocksize, essentially, including everything that
you're confident is in the mempool of other reasonably large miners.
Matt
On 08/29/15 16:43, Daniele Pinna via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I'd like to submit this paper to the dev-list which analyzes how miner
> advantages scale with network and mempool properties in a scenario of
> uncapped block sizes. The work proceeds, in a sense, from where Peter
> R's work left off correcting a mistake and addressing the critiques made
> by the community to his work.
>
> The main result of the work is a detailed analysis of mining advantages
> (defined as the added profit per unit of hash) as a function of miner
> hashrate. In it, I show how large block subsidies (or better, low
> mempool fees-to-subsidy ratios) incentivize the pooling of large
> hashrates due to the steady increasing of marginal profits as hashrates
> grow.
>
> The paper also shows that part of the large advantage the large miners
> have today is due to there being a barrier to entry into a
> high-efficiency mining class which has access to expected profits an
> order of magnitude larger than everyone else. As block subsidies
> decrease, this high-efficiency class is expected to vanish leading to a
> marginal profit structure which decreases as a function of hashrate.
>
> This work has vacuumed my entire life for the past two weeks leading me
> to lag behind on a lot of work. I apologize for typos which I may not
> have seen. I stand by for any comments the community may have and look
> forward to reigniting consideration of a block size scaling proposal
> (BIP101) which, due to the XT fork drama, I believe has been placed
> hastily and undeservedly on the chopping block.
>
> https://www.scribd.com/doc/276849939/On-the-Nature-of-Miner-Advantages-in-Uncapped-Block-Size-Fee-Markets
>
>
> Regards,
> Daniele
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>