Wladimir [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2014-04-09 📝 Original message:On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2014-04-09
📝 Original message:On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 7:33 PM, Alex Mizrahi <alex.mizrahi at gmail.com> wrote:
> 1) It's more private. Bloom filters gives away quite accurate statistical
>> information about what coins you own to whom ever you happen to be
>> connected too. An attacker can easily use this to deanonymize you even if
>> you don't reuse addresses; Tor does not help much against this attack.
>>
>
> There is also an option to download everything, but do only a very basic
> surface validation (without keeping track of UTXOs).
> You do not need a full node for that.
>
You may not *need* a full node, but the point of this (which I clearly
explained in my opening post) would be to support the network.
Wladimir
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📝 Original message:On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 7:33 PM, Alex Mizrahi <alex.mizrahi at gmail.com> wrote:
> 1) It's more private. Bloom filters gives away quite accurate statistical
>> information about what coins you own to whom ever you happen to be
>> connected too. An attacker can easily use this to deanonymize you even if
>> you don't reuse addresses; Tor does not help much against this attack.
>>
>
> There is also an option to download everything, but do only a very basic
> surface validation (without keeping track of UTXOs).
> You do not need a full node for that.
>
You may not *need* a full node, but the point of this (which I clearly
explained in my opening post) would be to support the network.
Wladimir
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