ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2021-10-05 📝 Original message:Good morning Nathan, > For ...
📅 Original date posted:2021-10-05
📝 Original message:Good morning Nathan,
> For purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some
> non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would
> be accepted by that rig?
>
> Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the
> network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their
> bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute?
They are "identified" by the address that is on the coinbase output.
There is nothing preventing a *single* miner having *multiple* addresses, in much the same way that a *single* HODLer is not prevented from having *multiple* addresses.
>
> Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be
> accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful
> block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light.
Since a miner can have multiple addresses, the miners can game this by simply grinding on *which* of their multiple addresses gets the green light.
That grinding is no more different in quality than grinding the block hash.
Thus, you just move proof-of-work elsewhere and make it harder to see, not reduce it.
Worse, *identifying* miners reduces the important anonymity property of mining.
With non-anonymous mining, it is much easier for states to co-opt large mines, since they are identifiable, and states can target larger miners.
Thus, miners ***must*** use multiple addresses as a simple protection against state co-option.
>
> Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the
> miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set by
> algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block.
The power consumption of proof-of-work ***is not a problem***, it is instead the solution against state co-option.
If you reduce the power consumption, it becomes easier for states to simply purchase and co-opt mines and attack the system, since it is easier to muster the power consumption and outright 51% Bitcoin.
The power consumption is an important security parameter, ***even more important than raw hashes-per-second***, since hashes-per-second will inevitably rise anyway even with constant power consumption.
It should always remain economically infeasible to 51% Bitcoin, otherwise Bitcoin will ***die*** and all your HODLings in it.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
📝 Original message:Good morning Nathan,
> For purposes of conserving energy, couldn't each mining rig have some
> non-gameable attribute which would be used to calculate if a block would
> be accepted by that rig?
>
> Don't the mining rigs have to be able to identify themselves to the
> network somehow, in order to claim their block reward? Could their
> bitcoin network ID be used as a non-gameable attribute?
They are "identified" by the address that is on the coinbase output.
There is nothing preventing a *single* miner having *multiple* addresses, in much the same way that a *single* HODLer is not prevented from having *multiple* addresses.
>
> Essentially a green light / red light system. In order for a block to be
> accepted by the network, it must have all attributes of a successful
> block today, and it must also have come from a rig that had a green light.
Since a miner can have multiple addresses, the miners can game this by simply grinding on *which* of their multiple addresses gets the green light.
That grinding is no more different in quality than grinding the block hash.
Thus, you just move proof-of-work elsewhere and make it harder to see, not reduce it.
Worse, *identifying* miners reduces the important anonymity property of mining.
With non-anonymous mining, it is much easier for states to co-opt large mines, since they are identifiable, and states can target larger miners.
Thus, miners ***must*** use multiple addresses as a simple protection against state co-option.
>
> Perhaps hash some data from the last successful block, along with the
> miners non-gameable attribute, and if it's below a certain number set by
> algorithm, the miner gets a green light to race to produce a valid block.
The power consumption of proof-of-work ***is not a problem***, it is instead the solution against state co-option.
If you reduce the power consumption, it becomes easier for states to simply purchase and co-opt mines and attack the system, since it is easier to muster the power consumption and outright 51% Bitcoin.
The power consumption is an important security parameter, ***even more important than raw hashes-per-second***, since hashes-per-second will inevitably rise anyway even with constant power consumption.
It should always remain economically infeasible to 51% Bitcoin, otherwise Bitcoin will ***die*** and all your HODLings in it.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj