Tejaswi Nadahalli [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2020-07-06 📝 Original message:On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at ...

📅 Original date posted:2020-07-06
📝 Original message:On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:49 PM Itay Tsabary <sitay at campus.technion.ac.il>
wrote:

> Note the required token amount for the collateral contract is low and
> independent of the required deposit tokens -- only a relatively small
> incentive is required to make "acting honestly" Bob's preferred choice.
> So, this is basically a negligible overhead, token-wise. As a downside, it
> does create slightly larger transactions (another UTXO, etc.).
>

I read the MAD-HTLC paper and I think it actually doesn't get into the size
of the collateral (v^{col}). I might have missed it though. Can you please
point me to the section in the paper where the amount is discussed?

I assumed that v^{col} has to be at least the size of v^{dep}. Otherwise,
Bob can threaten Alice with an HTLC bribery attack, and Alice knows that
Bob has very little to lose. Bob *should* have the same amount to lose, to
make it work - no?

>
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