Johnson Lau [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đź“… Original date posted:2018-03-05 đź“ť Original message:Altstack in v0 P2WSH ...
đź“… Original date posted:2018-03-05
đź“ť Original message:Altstack in v0 P2WSH should be left untouched. If anyone is already using altstack, BIP117 would very likely confiscate those UTXOs because the altstack would unlikely be executable.
Even in v1 witness, I think altstack should remain be a temporary data storage.
The “(many scripts) concatinated together in reverse order to form a serialized script” in BIP117 is exactly the same security hole of Satoshi’s scriptSig + OP_CODESAPARATOR + scriptPubKey . That means it is possible to skip execution of scriptPubKey by using a scriptSig with an invalid push operation, so the whole concatenated script becomes a simple push.
For SigOp limit, I think it’d become more and more difficult to maintain the current statical analyzability model as we try to introduce more functions. I think we should just migrate to a model of limiting sigop per weight, and count the actual number of sigop during execution. ( https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February/015764.html ) Actually, this approach is cheaper to analyse, as you only need to look at the witness size, and don’t need to look at the script at all.
> On 9 Jan 2018, at 6:22 AM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I've just re-read BIP 117, and I'm concerned about its flexibility. It
> seems to be doing too much.
>
> The use of altstack is awkward, and makes me query this entire approach.
> I understand that CLEANSTACK painted us into a corner here :(
>
> The simplest implementation of tail recursion would be a single blob: if
> a single element is left on the altstack, pop and execute it. That
> seems trivial to specify. The treatment of concatenation seems like
> trying to run before we can walk.
>
> Note that if we restrict this for a specific tx version, we can gain
> experience first and get fancier later.
>
> BIP 117 also drops SIGOP and opcode limits. This requires more
> justification, in particular, measurements and bounds on execution
> times. If this analysis has been done, I'm not aware of it.
>
> We could restore statically analyzability by rules like so:
> 1. Only applied for tx version 3 segwit txs.
> 2. For version 3, top element of stack is counted for limits (perhaps
> with discount).
> 3. The blob popped off for tail recursion must be identical to that top
> element of the stack (ie. the one counted above).
>
> Again, future tx versions could drop such restrictions.
>
> Cheers,
> Rusty.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
đź“ť Original message:Altstack in v0 P2WSH should be left untouched. If anyone is already using altstack, BIP117 would very likely confiscate those UTXOs because the altstack would unlikely be executable.
Even in v1 witness, I think altstack should remain be a temporary data storage.
The “(many scripts) concatinated together in reverse order to form a serialized script” in BIP117 is exactly the same security hole of Satoshi’s scriptSig + OP_CODESAPARATOR + scriptPubKey . That means it is possible to skip execution of scriptPubKey by using a scriptSig with an invalid push operation, so the whole concatenated script becomes a simple push.
For SigOp limit, I think it’d become more and more difficult to maintain the current statical analyzability model as we try to introduce more functions. I think we should just migrate to a model of limiting sigop per weight, and count the actual number of sigop during execution. ( https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-February/015764.html ) Actually, this approach is cheaper to analyse, as you only need to look at the witness size, and don’t need to look at the script at all.
> On 9 Jan 2018, at 6:22 AM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I've just re-read BIP 117, and I'm concerned about its flexibility. It
> seems to be doing too much.
>
> The use of altstack is awkward, and makes me query this entire approach.
> I understand that CLEANSTACK painted us into a corner here :(
>
> The simplest implementation of tail recursion would be a single blob: if
> a single element is left on the altstack, pop and execute it. That
> seems trivial to specify. The treatment of concatenation seems like
> trying to run before we can walk.
>
> Note that if we restrict this for a specific tx version, we can gain
> experience first and get fancier later.
>
> BIP 117 also drops SIGOP and opcode limits. This requires more
> justification, in particular, measurements and bounds on execution
> times. If this analysis has been done, I'm not aware of it.
>
> We could restore statically analyzability by rules like so:
> 1. Only applied for tx version 3 segwit txs.
> 2. For version 3, top element of stack is counted for limits (perhaps
> with discount).
> 3. The blob popped off for tail recursion must be identical to that top
> element of the stack (ie. the one counted above).
>
> Again, future tx versions could drop such restrictions.
>
> Cheers,
> Rusty.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev