steve on Nostr: “Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958” by David Galula & “Modern Warfare: A ...
“Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958” by David Galula &
“Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency” by Roger Trinquier
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The French, like most former colonial powers, had a wealth of experience conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in their former territories as their empires decayed. Galula was an experienced captain in the French army in the 1950s when he was sent to Algeria as a company commander to “pacify” the rising political rebellion there. In his personal recounting of his experiences, Galula identifies four basic principles of COIN: 1️⃣ the population is the objective 2️⃣ support from the population isn’t spontaneous; it must be organized 3️⃣ minority opposition will emerge 4️⃣ counterinsurgency forces can rarely (if ever) afford to control the entire territory. Galula’s memoir provides a good example of the temporal nature of COIN—progress quickly dissolves away without the consistent application of forces. Another French officer, Trinquier, was more senior to Galula when he wrote of his experiences in both Vietnam and Algeria. Trinquier attempts to identity irregular warfare as a fundamental paradigm shift in the nature of war, as originally theorized by the likes of Clausewitz and Jomini. Where Galula focused on empowering populations, Trinquier spoke primarily on controlling them. His prescriptions reek of colonial hubris and Francophone racism, yet still provide an important data point in irregular war theory. In fact, Trinquier‘s backward ideologies only reinforce the points made by Galula: a counterinsurgency is ultimately a battle over who can provide for the needs of the people. 🇫🇷🇩🇿
“Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency” by Roger Trinquier
⭐️⭐️⭐️
The French, like most former colonial powers, had a wealth of experience conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in their former territories as their empires decayed. Galula was an experienced captain in the French army in the 1950s when he was sent to Algeria as a company commander to “pacify” the rising political rebellion there. In his personal recounting of his experiences, Galula identifies four basic principles of COIN: 1️⃣ the population is the objective 2️⃣ support from the population isn’t spontaneous; it must be organized 3️⃣ minority opposition will emerge 4️⃣ counterinsurgency forces can rarely (if ever) afford to control the entire territory. Galula’s memoir provides a good example of the temporal nature of COIN—progress quickly dissolves away without the consistent application of forces. Another French officer, Trinquier, was more senior to Galula when he wrote of his experiences in both Vietnam and Algeria. Trinquier attempts to identity irregular warfare as a fundamental paradigm shift in the nature of war, as originally theorized by the likes of Clausewitz and Jomini. Where Galula focused on empowering populations, Trinquier spoke primarily on controlling them. His prescriptions reek of colonial hubris and Francophone racism, yet still provide an important data point in irregular war theory. In fact, Trinquier‘s backward ideologies only reinforce the points made by Galula: a counterinsurgency is ultimately a battle over who can provide for the needs of the people. 🇫🇷🇩🇿