Jeff Garzik [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-08-21 📝 Original message:I don't see any link to ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-08-21
📝 Original message:I don't see any link to data backing up "Bloom filter usage has declined
significantly"
Is there actual data showing this feature's use is declining or
non-existent?
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:55 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current
> wallets
> > in use?
>
> See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In short,
> not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the
> Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from
> non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set
> until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future.
>
>
> Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the landcape for
> (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key ways:
>
> 1) @mikehearn's [Cartographer](https://github.com/mikehearn/httpseed)
> seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to allow
> (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service bits,
> notable NODE_GETUTXOs.
>
> 2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV clients
> are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by the
> wallet
> authors. For instance
> [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet),
> [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/GreenBits),
> [AirBitz](
> https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_breadwallet/ctirou5
> ),
> and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in this category.
>
> 3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763) to
> have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy at all.
> Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers pose less
> privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attackable,
> peers
> using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very accurate
> wallet contents information.
>
> 4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack
> issues](
> https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context=3
> ),
> that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize increase
> proposals.
>
> Re: service bit identifier, I'd just pick 1<<3
>
> -https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d
>
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📝 Original message:I don't see any link to data backing up "Bloom filter usage has declined
significantly"
Is there actual data showing this feature's use is declining or
non-existent?
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 1:55 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 01:48:23AM -0400, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
> > If this is widely deployed + enabled, what is the impact to current
> wallets
> > in use?
>
> See my comment on the recently-opened issue, reproduced below. In short,
> not all that much, especially if we adopt my suggestion of having the
> Core implementation accept and respond to bloom filter requests from
> non-upgraded clients regardless of whether or not NODE_BLOOM was set
> until some fixed upgrade deadline in the future.
>
>
> Note that since the last time NODE_BLOOM was proposed, the landcape for
> (lite-)SPV clients has changed significantly in a few key ways:
>
> 1) @mikehearn's [Cartographer](https://github.com/mikehearn/httpseed)
> seed protocol has been created and deployed in production to allow
> (lite-)SPV clients to find nodes supporting arbitrary service bits,
> notable NODE_GETUTXOs.
>
> 2) Bloom filter usage has declined significantly, as lite-SPV clients
> are moving towards using centralized, trusted, servers run by the
> wallet
> authors. For instance
> [Mycelium](https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet),
> [GreenBits](https://github.com/greenaddress/GreenBits),
> [AirBitz](
> https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3etohn/whats_wrong_with_breadwallet/ctirou5
> ),
> and [Electrum](https://electrum.org/#home) all fall in this category.
>
> 3) Bloom filters [have been found](http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/763) to
> have severe privacy issues, offering essentially no privacy at all.
> Under many threat models a small number of trusted servers pose less
> privacy security risk than connecting to random, sybil-attackable,
> peers
> using unencrypted connections and giving those peers very accurate
> wallet contents information.
>
> 4) Finally, Bloom filters still have [unsolved DoS attack
> issues](
> https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3hjak7/the_hard_work_of_core_devs_not_xt_makes_bitcoin/cu9xntf?context=3
> ),
> that will get significantly worse under upcoming blocksize increase
> proposals.
>
> Re: service bit identifier, I'd just pick 1<<3
>
> -https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/6578#issuecomment-133226943
>
> --
> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> 00000000000000000402fe6fb9ad613c93e12bddfc6ec02a2bd92f002050594d
>
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