brockm on Nostr: I actually got distracted and didn't proof read that. Here is an edited version of ...
I actually got distracted and didn't proof read that. Here is an edited version of what I just said for clairty:
I never said that Davidson and Rees-Mogg advance the praxeological justification. I said the best attempts to justify that kind of thinking do. In fact, that the Sovereign Individual is silent on its normative foundations, and simply tracks a technological determinist argument — that to your point, the incentives leading intractably towards a certain outcome — is the entire basis for my charge of epistemic authoritarianism.
An example of what I’m saying would be the notion that say “the welfare state won’t be possible, even if people want it” in the future that is an intractible logical consequence of the incentive structures. That’s an implicit normative constraint that takes arguments about a common good that isn’t merely a feature of revealed market preferences off the table. Which, I say betrays a very extreme right-libertarian view at the bottom of the whole thesis.
So I apologize if I wasn’t clear enough in the following paragraph to separate the critique of the argument from the praxeological argument for the normative foundations of such a view. But I’d argue, if anything, I am trying to bring my critique against the strongest form of the argument. Which I don’t think Davidson and Rees-Mogg make, by the way.
I never said that Davidson and Rees-Mogg advance the praxeological justification. I said the best attempts to justify that kind of thinking do. In fact, that the Sovereign Individual is silent on its normative foundations, and simply tracks a technological determinist argument — that to your point, the incentives leading intractably towards a certain outcome — is the entire basis for my charge of epistemic authoritarianism.
An example of what I’m saying would be the notion that say “the welfare state won’t be possible, even if people want it” in the future that is an intractible logical consequence of the incentive structures. That’s an implicit normative constraint that takes arguments about a common good that isn’t merely a feature of revealed market preferences off the table. Which, I say betrays a very extreme right-libertarian view at the bottom of the whole thesis.
So I apologize if I wasn’t clear enough in the following paragraph to separate the critique of the argument from the praxeological argument for the normative foundations of such a view. But I’d argue, if anything, I am trying to bring my critique against the strongest form of the argument. Which I don’t think Davidson and Rees-Mogg make, by the way.