Jimmy [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-08-24 📝 Original message:Is this unrelated to ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-08-24
📝 Original message:Is this unrelated to Bitcoin Vigil idea published in 2014?
http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-vigil-program-guards-against-intrusion-coin-theft/
On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 8:42 AM Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Really nice idea. So its like a smart contract that incentivizes
> publication that a server has been hacked? I also really like how the
> funding has been handled -- with all the coins stored in the same address
> and then each server associated with a unique signature. That way, you
> don't have to split up all the coins among every server and reduce the
> incentive for an attacker yet you can still identify which server was
> hacked.
>
> It would be nice if after the attacker broke into the server that they
> were also incentivized to act on the information as soon as possible
> (revealing early on when the server was compromised.) I suppose you could
> split up the coins into different outputs that could optimally be redeemed
> by the owner at different points in the future -- so they're incentivzed to
> act lest their reward decays even more (this is of course, assuming that
> the monetary reward for this is greater than any possible legal
> consequences for the attacker -- it might not be. Thinking about this some
> more: it would also be somewhat hard to deny that this -wasn't- a honeypot
> with such a complex and unique scheme required for transactions, and I for
> one wouldn't like to reveal that I'd hacked a server if I knew it was all a
> calculated ploy. Don't honeypots rely on subtly?)
>
> What about also proving to an attacker that by breaking into a server they
> would be guaranteed a reward? I know that the use-case for this is proof of
> compromise so incentivizing a security audit would kind of fall more into
> an active invitation to audit but couldn't you also make a cryptocurrency
> that allowed coins to be moved based on a service banner existing at a
> given IP address? Attackers could then break into the server, setup a
> service that broadcasts their public key hash, and then spend coins locked
> at this special contract address to that pub key hash which miners would
> check on redemption (putting aside malicious use-cases for now.)
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Bitcoin-based honeypots incentivise intruders into revealing the fact
>> they have
>> broken into a server by allowing them to claim a reward based on secret
>> information obtained during the intrusion. Spending a bitcoin can only be
>> done
>> by publishing data to a public place - the Bitcoin blockchain - allowing
>> detection of the intrusion.
>>
>> The simplest way to achieve this is with one private key per server, with
>> each
>> server associated with one transaction output spendable by that key.
>> However
>> this isn't capital efficient if you have multiple servers to protect: if
>> we
>> have N servers and P bitcoins that we can afford to lose in the
>> compromise, one
>> key per server gives the intruder only N/P incentive.
>>
>> Previously Piete Wuille proposed(1) tree signatures for honeypots, with a
>> single txout protected by a 1-N tree of keys, with each server assigned a
>> specific key. Unfortunately though, tree signatures aren't yet
>> implemented in
>> the Bitcoin protocol.
>>
>> However with a 2-of-2 multisig and the SIGHASH_SINGLE feature we can
>> implement
>> this functionality with the existing Bitcoin protocol using the following
>> script:
>>
>> 2 <honeypot-pubkey> <distriminator-pubkey> 2 CHECKMULTISIG
>>
>> The honeypot secret key is shared among all N servers, and left on them.
>> The
>> distriminator secret key meanwhile is kept secret, however for each
>> server a
>> unique signature is created with SIGHASH_SINGLE, paying a token amount to
>> a
>> notification address. For each individual server a pre-signed signature
>> created
>> with the distriminator secret key is then left on the associated server
>> along
>> with the honeypot secret key.
>>
>> Recall the SIGHASH_SINGLE flag means that the signature only signs a
>> single
>> transaction input and transaction output; the transaction is allowed to
>> have
>> additional inputs and outputs added. This allows the thief to use the
>> honeypot
>> key to construct a claim transaction with an additional output added that
>> pays
>> an address that they own with the rest of the funds.
>>
>> Equally, we could also use SIGHASH_NONE, with the per-server discriminator
>> being the K value used in the pre-signed transaction.
>>
>> Note that Jeff Coleman deserves credit as co-inventor of all the above.
>>
>>
>> Censorship Resistance
>> =====================
>>
>> A potential disadvantage of using non-standard SIGHASH flags is that the
>> transactions involved are somewhat unusual, and may be flagged by
>> risk analysis at exchanges and the like, a threat to the fungibility of
>> the
>> reward.
>>
>> We can improve on the above concept from Todd/Coleman by using a
>> pre-signed
>> standard transaction instead. The pre-signed transaction spends the
>> honeypot
>> txout to two addresses, a per-server canary address, and a change
>> address. The
>> private key associated with the change addres is also left on the server,
>> and
>> the intruder can then spend that change output to finally collect their
>> reward.
>>
>> To any external observer the result looks like two normal transactions
>> created
>> in the process of someone with a standard wallet sending a small amount of
>> funds to an address, followed by sending a larger amount.
>>
>>
>> Doublespending
>> ==============
>>
>> A subtlety in the the two transactions concept is that the intruder
>> doesn't
>> have the necessary private keys to modify the first transaction, which
>> means
>> that the honeypot owner can respond to the compromise by doublespending
>> that
>> transaction, potentially recovering the honeypot while still learning
>> about the
>> compromise. While this is possible with all honeypots, if the first
>> transaction
>> is signed with the opt-in RBF flags, and CPFP-aware transaction
>> replacement is
>> not implemented by miners, the mechanics are particularly disadvantageous
>> to
>> the intruder, as the honeypot owner only needs to increase the first
>> transaction's fee slightly to have a high chance of recovering their
>> funds.
>> With CPFP-aware transaction replacement the intruder could in-turn
>> respond with
>> a high-fee CPFP second transaction, but currently no such implementation
>> is
>> known.
>>
>>
>> Scorched Earth
>> ==============
>>
>> We can use the "scorched earth" concept to improve the credibility of the
>> honeypot reward by making it costly for the honeypot owner to
>> doublespend. Here
>> a second version of the honeypot pre-signed transaction would also be
>> provided
>> which sepnds the entirety of the honeypot output to fees, and additionally
>> spends a second output to fees. An economically rational intruder will
>> publish
>> the first version, which maximizes the funds they get out of the
>> honeypot. If
>> the owner tries to dishonestly doublespend, they can respond by
>> publishing the
>> "scorched earth" transaction, encouraging the honeypot owner's honesty and
>> making CPFP-aware transaction replacement irrelevant.
>>
>> Of course, miner centralization adds complexity to the above: in many
>> instances
>> honeypot owners and/or intruders will be able to recover funds from
>> altruistic
>> miners. Equally, the additional complexity may discourage intruders from
>> making
>> use of the honeypot entirely.
>>
>> Note that as an implementation consideration CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY can be
>> used to
>> ensure the honeypot output can only be spent with transaction replacement
>> enabled, as CSV requires nSequence to be set in specific ways in any
>> transation
>> spending the output.
>>
>>
>> References
>> ==========
>>
>> 1) https://blockstream.com/2015/08/24/treesignatures/
>>
>> --
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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📝 Original message:Is this unrelated to Bitcoin Vigil idea published in 2014?
http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-vigil-program-guards-against-intrusion-coin-theft/
On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 8:42 AM Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Really nice idea. So its like a smart contract that incentivizes
> publication that a server has been hacked? I also really like how the
> funding has been handled -- with all the coins stored in the same address
> and then each server associated with a unique signature. That way, you
> don't have to split up all the coins among every server and reduce the
> incentive for an attacker yet you can still identify which server was
> hacked.
>
> It would be nice if after the attacker broke into the server that they
> were also incentivized to act on the information as soon as possible
> (revealing early on when the server was compromised.) I suppose you could
> split up the coins into different outputs that could optimally be redeemed
> by the owner at different points in the future -- so they're incentivzed to
> act lest their reward decays even more (this is of course, assuming that
> the monetary reward for this is greater than any possible legal
> consequences for the attacker -- it might not be. Thinking about this some
> more: it would also be somewhat hard to deny that this -wasn't- a honeypot
> with such a complex and unique scheme required for transactions, and I for
> one wouldn't like to reveal that I'd hacked a server if I knew it was all a
> calculated ploy. Don't honeypots rely on subtly?)
>
> What about also proving to an attacker that by breaking into a server they
> would be guaranteed a reward? I know that the use-case for this is proof of
> compromise so incentivizing a security audit would kind of fall more into
> an active invitation to audit but couldn't you also make a cryptocurrency
> that allowed coins to be moved based on a service banner existing at a
> given IP address? Attackers could then break into the server, setup a
> service that broadcasts their public key hash, and then spend coins locked
> at this special contract address to that pub key hash which miners would
> check on redemption (putting aside malicious use-cases for now.)
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Bitcoin-based honeypots incentivise intruders into revealing the fact
>> they have
>> broken into a server by allowing them to claim a reward based on secret
>> information obtained during the intrusion. Spending a bitcoin can only be
>> done
>> by publishing data to a public place - the Bitcoin blockchain - allowing
>> detection of the intrusion.
>>
>> The simplest way to achieve this is with one private key per server, with
>> each
>> server associated with one transaction output spendable by that key.
>> However
>> this isn't capital efficient if you have multiple servers to protect: if
>> we
>> have N servers and P bitcoins that we can afford to lose in the
>> compromise, one
>> key per server gives the intruder only N/P incentive.
>>
>> Previously Piete Wuille proposed(1) tree signatures for honeypots, with a
>> single txout protected by a 1-N tree of keys, with each server assigned a
>> specific key. Unfortunately though, tree signatures aren't yet
>> implemented in
>> the Bitcoin protocol.
>>
>> However with a 2-of-2 multisig and the SIGHASH_SINGLE feature we can
>> implement
>> this functionality with the existing Bitcoin protocol using the following
>> script:
>>
>> 2 <honeypot-pubkey> <distriminator-pubkey> 2 CHECKMULTISIG
>>
>> The honeypot secret key is shared among all N servers, and left on them.
>> The
>> distriminator secret key meanwhile is kept secret, however for each
>> server a
>> unique signature is created with SIGHASH_SINGLE, paying a token amount to
>> a
>> notification address. For each individual server a pre-signed signature
>> created
>> with the distriminator secret key is then left on the associated server
>> along
>> with the honeypot secret key.
>>
>> Recall the SIGHASH_SINGLE flag means that the signature only signs a
>> single
>> transaction input and transaction output; the transaction is allowed to
>> have
>> additional inputs and outputs added. This allows the thief to use the
>> honeypot
>> key to construct a claim transaction with an additional output added that
>> pays
>> an address that they own with the rest of the funds.
>>
>> Equally, we could also use SIGHASH_NONE, with the per-server discriminator
>> being the K value used in the pre-signed transaction.
>>
>> Note that Jeff Coleman deserves credit as co-inventor of all the above.
>>
>>
>> Censorship Resistance
>> =====================
>>
>> A potential disadvantage of using non-standard SIGHASH flags is that the
>> transactions involved are somewhat unusual, and may be flagged by
>> risk analysis at exchanges and the like, a threat to the fungibility of
>> the
>> reward.
>>
>> We can improve on the above concept from Todd/Coleman by using a
>> pre-signed
>> standard transaction instead. The pre-signed transaction spends the
>> honeypot
>> txout to two addresses, a per-server canary address, and a change
>> address. The
>> private key associated with the change addres is also left on the server,
>> and
>> the intruder can then spend that change output to finally collect their
>> reward.
>>
>> To any external observer the result looks like two normal transactions
>> created
>> in the process of someone with a standard wallet sending a small amount of
>> funds to an address, followed by sending a larger amount.
>>
>>
>> Doublespending
>> ==============
>>
>> A subtlety in the the two transactions concept is that the intruder
>> doesn't
>> have the necessary private keys to modify the first transaction, which
>> means
>> that the honeypot owner can respond to the compromise by doublespending
>> that
>> transaction, potentially recovering the honeypot while still learning
>> about the
>> compromise. While this is possible with all honeypots, if the first
>> transaction
>> is signed with the opt-in RBF flags, and CPFP-aware transaction
>> replacement is
>> not implemented by miners, the mechanics are particularly disadvantageous
>> to
>> the intruder, as the honeypot owner only needs to increase the first
>> transaction's fee slightly to have a high chance of recovering their
>> funds.
>> With CPFP-aware transaction replacement the intruder could in-turn
>> respond with
>> a high-fee CPFP second transaction, but currently no such implementation
>> is
>> known.
>>
>>
>> Scorched Earth
>> ==============
>>
>> We can use the "scorched earth" concept to improve the credibility of the
>> honeypot reward by making it costly for the honeypot owner to
>> doublespend. Here
>> a second version of the honeypot pre-signed transaction would also be
>> provided
>> which sepnds the entirety of the honeypot output to fees, and additionally
>> spends a second output to fees. An economically rational intruder will
>> publish
>> the first version, which maximizes the funds they get out of the
>> honeypot. If
>> the owner tries to dishonestly doublespend, they can respond by
>> publishing the
>> "scorched earth" transaction, encouraging the honeypot owner's honesty and
>> making CPFP-aware transaction replacement irrelevant.
>>
>> Of course, miner centralization adds complexity to the above: in many
>> instances
>> honeypot owners and/or intruders will be able to recover funds from
>> altruistic
>> miners. Equally, the additional complexity may discourage intruders from
>> making
>> use of the honeypot entirely.
>>
>> Note that as an implementation consideration CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY can be
>> used to
>> ensure the honeypot output can only be spent with transaction replacement
>> enabled, as CSV requires nSequence to be set in specific ways in any
>> transation
>> spending the output.
>>
>>
>> References
>> ==========
>>
>> 1) https://blockstream.com/2015/08/24/treesignatures/
>>
>> --
>> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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