Jeremy [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π Original date posted:2019-05-22 π Original message:Morning, Yes, in general, ...
π
Original date posted:2019-05-22
π Original message:Morning,
Yes, in general, Bitcoin does not do anything to prevent users from
discarding their keys.
I don't think this will be fixed anytime soon.
There are some protocols where, though, knowing that a key was once known
to the recipients may make it legally valid to inflict a punitive measure
(e.g., via HTLC), whereas if the key was never known that might be a breach
of contract for the payment provider.
Best,
Jeremy
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:52 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> >If a sender needs to know the recipient can remove the covenant before
> spending, they may request a signature of an challenge string from the
> recipients
>
> The recipients can always choose to destroy the privkey after providing
> the above signature.
> Indeed, the recipients can always insist on not cooperating to sign using
> the taproot branch and thus force spending via the
> `OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY`.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
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π Original message:Morning,
Yes, in general, Bitcoin does not do anything to prevent users from
discarding their keys.
I don't think this will be fixed anytime soon.
There are some protocols where, though, knowing that a key was once known
to the recipients may make it legally valid to inflict a punitive measure
(e.g., via HTLC), whereas if the key was never known that might be a breach
of contract for the payment provider.
Best,
Jeremy
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:52 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
> Good morning Jeremy,
>
> >If a sender needs to know the recipient can remove the covenant before
> spending, they may request a signature of an challenge string from the
> recipients
>
> The recipients can always choose to destroy the privkey after providing
> the above signature.
> Indeed, the recipients can always insist on not cooperating to sign using
> the taproot branch and thus force spending via the
> `OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY`.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
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