Carla Kirk-Cohen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2023-01-30 🗒️ Summary of this message: The Lightning ...
đź“… Original date posted:2023-01-30
🗒️ Summary of this message: The Lightning Network community resumed their fortnightly channel jamming mitigation calls for 2023, discussing upgrade mechanisms and upfront fees.
đź“ť Original message:
Hi list,
On Monday last week we resumed our fortnightly channel jamming
mitigation calls for 2023.
Details for the next call:
* Monday 02/06 @ 18:00 UTC
* https://meet.jit.si/UnjammingLN
* Agenda: https://github.com/ClaraShk/LNJamming/issues/2
# Meeting Summary
This email attempts to summarize the discussion, but is of course
subject to my errors and opinions so the full transcript is available
at [1]. It is (imperfectly) AI generated, so please reach out to myself
or Clara if you'd like clarification for a specific section.
1. Upgrade Mechanisms
The first topic of discussion was around how we would go about
upgrading the network to support an anti-jamming mitigation. Most
solutions share the following characteristics:
* They will likely require a network wide upgrade: when a sender
makes a payment, the full path will need to understand the new
feature bit for it to be used.
* Sending nodes are unlikely to be incentivised to upgrade to
support a channel jamming mitigation, as jamming mitigations incur
additional cost (be it in the form of upfront fees, tokens or some
other mechanism).
* Routing nodes have no way of knowing whether a payment comes from
a node that is not upgraded, or simply doesn't want to pay the
additional cost introduced by a jamming mitigation.
It was generally agreed that the network is still in an early enough
stage that it is fair for relaying nodes to initially upgrade but not
enforce the feature, and later look at forwarding traffic to determine
whether it is appropriate to require the feature. This will require
sending nodes to opt-in to the new feature before the network can
widely enforce it, as no rational routing node will require a feature
which would reduce its ability to serve un-upgraded traffic (unless
under attack, which is not the case at present).
A note was also made that wallets tend to upgrade less frequently, in
part because some providers run forked versions of LN implementations,
so this horizon may be quite long. It was emphasized that this type of
network upgrade would require input from wallets, designers and
application developers anyway, so hopefully by the time we look to
deploy a change there is rough consensus among the Lightning community
already.
2. Upfront Fees
Next, we discussed the draft proposal for upfront fees [2] that
implements the first of a two-part jamming mitigation described in [3].
As it stands, the PR describes the simplest possible way to introduce
upfront fees to the protocol:
* Upfront fees are expressed as a ppm of a channel's success-case
fees, and charged on the outgoing link of a route.
* Nodes can advertise custom upfront fee rates if desired, but to
save gossip bandwidth we assume a network-wide default of 1%.
* Upfront fees accumulate along the route (as htlc payment amounts
do), and are simply pushed to the `to_remote` balance on
`update_add_htlc`.
* Final hop nodes advertise an upfront fee policy in bolt 11 invoices
(or bolt 12 blinded routes) which is sufficiently padded to
obfuscate their location in the route.
The interaction between upfront fees and possible future protocol
changes such as inbound fees and negative fees was briefly discussed,
specifically the case where a node sets low (or negative) fees to
attract traffic then fails payments to accumulate upfront fees. As is,
all implementations’ algorithms optimize for factors other than fees -
specifically avoiding a node once it's produced failures - and we
suspect that careful sender-side behavior will mitigate this risk.
However, it was also acknowledged that a node that attempts this attack
may be able to fool multiple individual senders and still be able to
accumulate some fees.
We then discussed the shortcomings of the "simplest possible" upfront
fees in [2], specifically focused on the following scenario where
nodes receive 1% of their success-case fees as an upfront payment:
* Alice is sending a payment to Dave, who is a popular sink node in
the network.
* Bob -> Carol has low/default routing policy: 1000 msat success
case / 10 msat upfront fee
* Carol -> Dave has high fees: 400,000 msat success case / 4000 msat
upfront fee
* Dave advertises no success case fee (is recipient) / 100 msat of
upfront fee chosen for his invoice.
Alice ------ Bob ------ Carol ------ Dave
Since we need to source all of these funds from the sender (Alice), the
forwarding of funds is as follows:
* Alice pushes 4110 msat to Bob.
* Bob _should_ push 4100 msat to Carol, claiming his 10 msat upfront
fee.
* Carol _should_ push 100 msat to Dave, claiming her 4000 msat
upfront fee.
However, Bob has no real incentive to forward the HTLC to Carol and
push her the 4100 msat because that value is more than the fees he'll
earn from successfully forwarding and settling the HTLC (10 msat
upfront fees + 1000 msat success case fees). It's worth noting that
this type of fee differential already exists in the network today - I
got these example numbers by looking at the fee rates of the Loop
node's peers [4].
There were a few points discussed around this issue:
* Whether we should look into a more complicated approach that
includes a "proof of forward" secret in the next node's onion which
must be supplied to claim the upfront fee.
* Discussion about whether these order of magnitude fee differences
will exist in an efficient market (differing opinions).
* Whether Bob _would_ steal the upfront fee by dropping the payment,
as it'll impact nodes' desire to route through them in future.
* Is there a way to deliver upfront fees to nodes along the route
*without* them adding up along the route (other than the naive
version of sending each hop a payment, which comes with its own
problems)? Seems not, but bright ideas are wanted and welcome!
* That nodes will decide where they fall in the trade-off of setting
upfront fees to cover their opportunity cost for high routing fees
and market pressure to keep these fees low for the sake of
remaining competitive.
A few people mentioned the desire to keep an upfront fee solution as
simple as possible, but generally it seemed that a solution where the
accumulated upfront fees at any point along a route exceed any single
hop's expected success case fees is unacceptable because incentives
are misaligned (even if we can properly attribute errors with [5]).
We touched briefly on a few "proof of forwarding" solutions for
upfront fees:
* Using a locking mechanism that relies on a secret that is provided
by the next node's onion.
* A taproot tree for all HTLCs where each leaf has a subset of HTLCs,
and fees could be incorporated here (summary note: apparently some
work has been done here, but I couldn't find the link).
* If we're confident that a more complicated solution will solve many
problems, then we should pursue them, otherwise a simple solution
is possibly a _good enough_ first step.
There was some discussion about how we want to go about addressing
spamming in the network:
* Is it good enough to deploy something today that just charges a
simple, capped upfront fee (eg 1 sat per hop) that solves jamming
for the current state of the network and allows us to learn
something then iterate?
* Should our first attempt at solving this issue be for a future
steady state where nodes have significant traffic and nodes face
real opportunity cost (in the form of lost revenue) if they are
targeted by a jamming attack?
3. Circuit Breaker Update
* Circuit breaker has a UI now, and some issues are being opened in
the repo so people have at minimum gone through the effort to spin
it up.
* It's still pretty manual, but it does provide node operators with
information about the payment failures on their nodes (not easily
surfaced in many LN UIs).
* Hoping to get insights into stuck HTLCs and spam HTLCs so that we
can learn from real life experience.
* Circuit breaker is generally pushing in the same direction as the
reputation scheme in [3], just a more manual one. We could
possibly use it to visualize the endorsement system in [3] before
enforcing it.
* While circuit breaker isn't necessarily *the* solution to solving
jamming on LN, it provides us with some data points and a
practical way for individual operators to address spamming of
their nodes.
3. Tokens Update
Since our last discussion an architecture document was added to the
proposal [6], details in the mailing list post [7]. The main goal is
to try to dissociate the people paying the fees from those gaining the
benefits from the credentials, so that credentials can be paid by a
LSP (for example).
4. Reputation discussions in LSP Specification
Some attendees have been working on a reputation system for the LSP
specification group [8]. This system is intended to provide standard
metrics about what makes a node good/bad to connect to in the context
of a decentralized marketplace. While this work looks at the problem
from a different perspective, there's a possibility to consolidate
the efforts. It seems particularly useful in the anti-jamming case
where a node has newly connected to you, and needs a "start state"
reputation score. The idea of defining what qualifies as good
behavior in the Lightning Network is useful across the board. The
LSP specification group also has bi-weekly calls, and welcomes
additional participants!
5. Call Cadence
Attendees agreed to continue with calls every two weeks. General
consensus was that we would aim for a 30 minute meeting with the
option to extend to an hour if discussion warrants it.
# What's next
Thanks to everyone who attended last week's meeting, we hope to see
more folks in the next one!
There's a lot to discuss - brave readers who made it all the way to
the bottom of this email will notice a fair number of question marks
scattered about - and we're going to continue to break the problem
down into smaller parts to discuss in the hope of making progress.
Any change to the Lightning Network that aims to address channel
jamming attacks will be a significant (but necessary) change to the
protocol, and it's going to need input from many different
stakeholders. Please reach out here or in private
(carla at chaincode.com / clara at chaincode.com) if you have any questions
/ concerns / comments!
Cheers until next time,
Carla and Clara
(Yes, our names are confusing. No, you won't get used to it)
[1]
https://github.com/ClaraShk/LNJamming/blob/main/meeting-transcripts/23-01-23-transcript.md
[2] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1052
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1454.pdf
[4]
https://mempool.space/lightning/node/021c97a90a411ff2b10dc2a8e32de2f29d2fa49d41bfbb52bd416e460db0747d0d
[5] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1044
[6] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1043
[8] https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/issues/12
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🗒️ Summary of this message: The Lightning Network community resumed their fortnightly channel jamming mitigation calls for 2023, discussing upgrade mechanisms and upfront fees.
đź“ť Original message:
Hi list,
On Monday last week we resumed our fortnightly channel jamming
mitigation calls for 2023.
Details for the next call:
* Monday 02/06 @ 18:00 UTC
* https://meet.jit.si/UnjammingLN
* Agenda: https://github.com/ClaraShk/LNJamming/issues/2
# Meeting Summary
This email attempts to summarize the discussion, but is of course
subject to my errors and opinions so the full transcript is available
at [1]. It is (imperfectly) AI generated, so please reach out to myself
or Clara if you'd like clarification for a specific section.
1. Upgrade Mechanisms
The first topic of discussion was around how we would go about
upgrading the network to support an anti-jamming mitigation. Most
solutions share the following characteristics:
* They will likely require a network wide upgrade: when a sender
makes a payment, the full path will need to understand the new
feature bit for it to be used.
* Sending nodes are unlikely to be incentivised to upgrade to
support a channel jamming mitigation, as jamming mitigations incur
additional cost (be it in the form of upfront fees, tokens or some
other mechanism).
* Routing nodes have no way of knowing whether a payment comes from
a node that is not upgraded, or simply doesn't want to pay the
additional cost introduced by a jamming mitigation.
It was generally agreed that the network is still in an early enough
stage that it is fair for relaying nodes to initially upgrade but not
enforce the feature, and later look at forwarding traffic to determine
whether it is appropriate to require the feature. This will require
sending nodes to opt-in to the new feature before the network can
widely enforce it, as no rational routing node will require a feature
which would reduce its ability to serve un-upgraded traffic (unless
under attack, which is not the case at present).
A note was also made that wallets tend to upgrade less frequently, in
part because some providers run forked versions of LN implementations,
so this horizon may be quite long. It was emphasized that this type of
network upgrade would require input from wallets, designers and
application developers anyway, so hopefully by the time we look to
deploy a change there is rough consensus among the Lightning community
already.
2. Upfront Fees
Next, we discussed the draft proposal for upfront fees [2] that
implements the first of a two-part jamming mitigation described in [3].
As it stands, the PR describes the simplest possible way to introduce
upfront fees to the protocol:
* Upfront fees are expressed as a ppm of a channel's success-case
fees, and charged on the outgoing link of a route.
* Nodes can advertise custom upfront fee rates if desired, but to
save gossip bandwidth we assume a network-wide default of 1%.
* Upfront fees accumulate along the route (as htlc payment amounts
do), and are simply pushed to the `to_remote` balance on
`update_add_htlc`.
* Final hop nodes advertise an upfront fee policy in bolt 11 invoices
(or bolt 12 blinded routes) which is sufficiently padded to
obfuscate their location in the route.
The interaction between upfront fees and possible future protocol
changes such as inbound fees and negative fees was briefly discussed,
specifically the case where a node sets low (or negative) fees to
attract traffic then fails payments to accumulate upfront fees. As is,
all implementations’ algorithms optimize for factors other than fees -
specifically avoiding a node once it's produced failures - and we
suspect that careful sender-side behavior will mitigate this risk.
However, it was also acknowledged that a node that attempts this attack
may be able to fool multiple individual senders and still be able to
accumulate some fees.
We then discussed the shortcomings of the "simplest possible" upfront
fees in [2], specifically focused on the following scenario where
nodes receive 1% of their success-case fees as an upfront payment:
* Alice is sending a payment to Dave, who is a popular sink node in
the network.
* Bob -> Carol has low/default routing policy: 1000 msat success
case / 10 msat upfront fee
* Carol -> Dave has high fees: 400,000 msat success case / 4000 msat
upfront fee
* Dave advertises no success case fee (is recipient) / 100 msat of
upfront fee chosen for his invoice.
Alice ------ Bob ------ Carol ------ Dave
Since we need to source all of these funds from the sender (Alice), the
forwarding of funds is as follows:
* Alice pushes 4110 msat to Bob.
* Bob _should_ push 4100 msat to Carol, claiming his 10 msat upfront
fee.
* Carol _should_ push 100 msat to Dave, claiming her 4000 msat
upfront fee.
However, Bob has no real incentive to forward the HTLC to Carol and
push her the 4100 msat because that value is more than the fees he'll
earn from successfully forwarding and settling the HTLC (10 msat
upfront fees + 1000 msat success case fees). It's worth noting that
this type of fee differential already exists in the network today - I
got these example numbers by looking at the fee rates of the Loop
node's peers [4].
There were a few points discussed around this issue:
* Whether we should look into a more complicated approach that
includes a "proof of forward" secret in the next node's onion which
must be supplied to claim the upfront fee.
* Discussion about whether these order of magnitude fee differences
will exist in an efficient market (differing opinions).
* Whether Bob _would_ steal the upfront fee by dropping the payment,
as it'll impact nodes' desire to route through them in future.
* Is there a way to deliver upfront fees to nodes along the route
*without* them adding up along the route (other than the naive
version of sending each hop a payment, which comes with its own
problems)? Seems not, but bright ideas are wanted and welcome!
* That nodes will decide where they fall in the trade-off of setting
upfront fees to cover their opportunity cost for high routing fees
and market pressure to keep these fees low for the sake of
remaining competitive.
A few people mentioned the desire to keep an upfront fee solution as
simple as possible, but generally it seemed that a solution where the
accumulated upfront fees at any point along a route exceed any single
hop's expected success case fees is unacceptable because incentives
are misaligned (even if we can properly attribute errors with [5]).
We touched briefly on a few "proof of forwarding" solutions for
upfront fees:
* Using a locking mechanism that relies on a secret that is provided
by the next node's onion.
* A taproot tree for all HTLCs where each leaf has a subset of HTLCs,
and fees could be incorporated here (summary note: apparently some
work has been done here, but I couldn't find the link).
* If we're confident that a more complicated solution will solve many
problems, then we should pursue them, otherwise a simple solution
is possibly a _good enough_ first step.
There was some discussion about how we want to go about addressing
spamming in the network:
* Is it good enough to deploy something today that just charges a
simple, capped upfront fee (eg 1 sat per hop) that solves jamming
for the current state of the network and allows us to learn
something then iterate?
* Should our first attempt at solving this issue be for a future
steady state where nodes have significant traffic and nodes face
real opportunity cost (in the form of lost revenue) if they are
targeted by a jamming attack?
3. Circuit Breaker Update
* Circuit breaker has a UI now, and some issues are being opened in
the repo so people have at minimum gone through the effort to spin
it up.
* It's still pretty manual, but it does provide node operators with
information about the payment failures on their nodes (not easily
surfaced in many LN UIs).
* Hoping to get insights into stuck HTLCs and spam HTLCs so that we
can learn from real life experience.
* Circuit breaker is generally pushing in the same direction as the
reputation scheme in [3], just a more manual one. We could
possibly use it to visualize the endorsement system in [3] before
enforcing it.
* While circuit breaker isn't necessarily *the* solution to solving
jamming on LN, it provides us with some data points and a
practical way for individual operators to address spamming of
their nodes.
3. Tokens Update
Since our last discussion an architecture document was added to the
proposal [6], details in the mailing list post [7]. The main goal is
to try to dissociate the people paying the fees from those gaining the
benefits from the credentials, so that credentials can be paid by a
LSP (for example).
4. Reputation discussions in LSP Specification
Some attendees have been working on a reputation system for the LSP
specification group [8]. This system is intended to provide standard
metrics about what makes a node good/bad to connect to in the context
of a decentralized marketplace. While this work looks at the problem
from a different perspective, there's a possibility to consolidate
the efforts. It seems particularly useful in the anti-jamming case
where a node has newly connected to you, and needs a "start state"
reputation score. The idea of defining what qualifies as good
behavior in the Lightning Network is useful across the board. The
LSP specification group also has bi-weekly calls, and welcomes
additional participants!
5. Call Cadence
Attendees agreed to continue with calls every two weeks. General
consensus was that we would aim for a 30 minute meeting with the
option to extend to an hour if discussion warrants it.
# What's next
Thanks to everyone who attended last week's meeting, we hope to see
more folks in the next one!
There's a lot to discuss - brave readers who made it all the way to
the bottom of this email will notice a fair number of question marks
scattered about - and we're going to continue to break the problem
down into smaller parts to discuss in the hope of making progress.
Any change to the Lightning Network that aims to address channel
jamming attacks will be a significant (but necessary) change to the
protocol, and it's going to need input from many different
stakeholders. Please reach out here or in private
(carla at chaincode.com / clara at chaincode.com) if you have any questions
/ concerns / comments!
Cheers until next time,
Carla and Clara
(Yes, our names are confusing. No, you won't get used to it)
[1]
https://github.com/ClaraShk/LNJamming/blob/main/meeting-transcripts/23-01-23-transcript.md
[2] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1052
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1454.pdf
[4]
https://mempool.space/lightning/node/021c97a90a411ff2b10dc2a8e32de2f29d2fa49d41bfbb52bd416e460db0747d0d
[5] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1044
[6] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1043
[8] https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/issues/12
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