Bram Cohen [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-04-10 📝 Original message:From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-04-10
📝 Original message:From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32 at gmail.com>
>
> > Furthermore, the Taro script is not enforced by Bitcoin, meaning those
> who
> > control the Bitcoin script can always choose to ignore the Taro script
> and
> > destroy the Taro assets as a result.
>
> This is correct, as a result in most contexts, an incentive exists for the
> holder of an asset to observe the Taro validation rules as otherwise, their
> assets are burnt in the process from the PoV of asset verifiers. In the
> single
> party case things are pretty straight forward, but more care needs to be
> taken
> in cases where one attempts to express partial application and permits
> anyone
> to spend a UTXO in question.
>
> By strongly binding all assets to Bitcoin UTXOs, we resolve issues related
> to
> double spending or duplicate assets, but needs to mind the fact that assets
> can
> be burnt if a user doesn't supply a valid witness. There're likely ways to
> get
> around this by lessening the binding to Bitcoin UTXO's, but then the system
> would need to be able to collect, retain and order all the set of possible
> spends, essentially requiring a parallel network. The core of the system as
> it
> stands today is pretty simple (which was an explicit design goal to avoid
> getting forever distracted by the large design space), with a minimal
> implementation being relatively compact given all the Bitcoin
> context/design
> re-use.
>
The TARO set of tradeoffs is fairly coherent but is subject to certain
limitations (modulo my understanding of it being off):
The witnesses for transactions need to be put into Bitcoin transactions
even though the Bitcoin layer doesn't understand them
There needs to be a constraint on Taro transactions which is understood by
the Bitcoin layer (which often/usually happens naturally because there's a
user signature but sometimes doesn't. It's a limitation)
Multiple Taro coins can't consolidate their value into a single output
because they only support a single linear history
Taro issuance is limited to a single event rather than potentially multiple
events over time subject to special per-asset rules.
This seems like a fairly logical approach (although my understanding of the
limitations/tradeoffs could be wrong, especially with regards to
consolidation). There's nothing wrong with a system having well documented
limitations, but I am puzzled by the announcement saying Taro assets are
'analogous with' colored coins. Taro assets are straightforwardly and
unambiguously colored coins and that isn't something to be ashamed of.
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📝 Original message:From: Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laolu32 at gmail.com>
>
> > Furthermore, the Taro script is not enforced by Bitcoin, meaning those
> who
> > control the Bitcoin script can always choose to ignore the Taro script
> and
> > destroy the Taro assets as a result.
>
> This is correct, as a result in most contexts, an incentive exists for the
> holder of an asset to observe the Taro validation rules as otherwise, their
> assets are burnt in the process from the PoV of asset verifiers. In the
> single
> party case things are pretty straight forward, but more care needs to be
> taken
> in cases where one attempts to express partial application and permits
> anyone
> to spend a UTXO in question.
>
> By strongly binding all assets to Bitcoin UTXOs, we resolve issues related
> to
> double spending or duplicate assets, but needs to mind the fact that assets
> can
> be burnt if a user doesn't supply a valid witness. There're likely ways to
> get
> around this by lessening the binding to Bitcoin UTXO's, but then the system
> would need to be able to collect, retain and order all the set of possible
> spends, essentially requiring a parallel network. The core of the system as
> it
> stands today is pretty simple (which was an explicit design goal to avoid
> getting forever distracted by the large design space), with a minimal
> implementation being relatively compact given all the Bitcoin
> context/design
> re-use.
>
The TARO set of tradeoffs is fairly coherent but is subject to certain
limitations (modulo my understanding of it being off):
The witnesses for transactions need to be put into Bitcoin transactions
even though the Bitcoin layer doesn't understand them
There needs to be a constraint on Taro transactions which is understood by
the Bitcoin layer (which often/usually happens naturally because there's a
user signature but sometimes doesn't. It's a limitation)
Multiple Taro coins can't consolidate their value into a single output
because they only support a single linear history
Taro issuance is limited to a single event rather than potentially multiple
events over time subject to special per-asset rules.
This seems like a fairly logical approach (although my understanding of the
limitations/tradeoffs could be wrong, especially with regards to
consolidation). There's nothing wrong with a system having well documented
limitations, but I am puzzled by the announcement saying Taro assets are
'analogous with' colored coins. Taro assets are straightforwardly and
unambiguously colored coins and that isn't something to be ashamed of.
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