Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đź“… Original date posted:2019-06-30 đź“ť Original message:Could you please explain ...
đź“… Original date posted:2019-06-30
📝 Original message:Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” as it pertains to such encumbered coins?
The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be traded for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable simply because it’s a record.
e
> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>>> On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to her, or anyone else.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control of a scarce resource.
>>>
>>> Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control and ability to deal with temporary control.
>>
>> For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility.
>
> There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register.
> We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the common ones.
>
> Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You say no one would assign them any value.
>
> I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves.
> You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got that, but suppose we do not discuss this here.
> If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find having an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to maintain that register valuable to some extent.
>
>>
>>> I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market.
>>
>> I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is necessary. I am merely explaining the market.
>>
>
> You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not yet there will follow your arguments.
>
>>> Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary control of Bitcoin can not have value.
>>
>> It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of control. One presumes an ability to trade control of it for something else. This is temporary control. Final control would be the case in which, at some point, it can no longer be traded, making it worthless at that point. If this is known to be the case it implies that it it worthless at all prior points as well.
>>
>> These are distinct scenarios. The fact that temporary (in my usage) control implies the possibility of value does not imply that finality of control does as well. The fact that (renowned or otherwise) people have made errors does not imply that I am making an error. These are both non-sequiturs.
>>
>>> I say, that temporary control does not have value until means dealing with it are offered, and that is I work on. Thereafter might obtain value if final control is deemed too expensive or not attainable, we shall see.
>>
>> The analogy to rental of a consumable good does not apply to the case of a non-consumable good. If it cannot be traded and cannot be consumed it cannot obtain marketable value. To this point it matters not whether it exists.
>>
>
> I meant with control the control of entries in the register which I think is the deeper utility of Bitcoin. Final control is meant to be the opposite of temporary which is the time limited control with some expiry.
>
> Thank you for your thoughts as they help to sharpen my arguments.
>
> Best,
>
> Tamas Blummer
>
>> Best,
>> Eric
>>
>>> Tamas Blummer
>>>
>>>
>
📝 Original message:Could you please explain the meaning and utility of “unforgeable register” as it pertains to such encumbered coins?
The meaning in terms of Bitcoin is clear - the “owner” of outputs that represent value (i.e. in the ability to trade them for something else) is recorded publicly and, given Bitcoin security assumptions, cannot be faked. What is not clear is the utility of a record of outputs that cannot be traded for something else. You seem to imply that a record is valuable simply because it’s a record.
e
> On Jun 30, 2019, at 11:35, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 19:41, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On Jun 30, 2019, at 03:56, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>>> On Jun 29, 2019, at 23:21, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> What loan? Alice has paid Bob for something of no possible utility to her, or anyone else.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Coins encumbered with the described covenant represent temporary control of a scarce resource.
>>>
>>> Can this obtain value? That depends on the availability of final control and ability to deal with temporary control.
>>
>> For something to become property (and therefore have marketable value) requires that it be both scarce and useful. Bitcoin is useful only to the extent that it can be traded for something else that is useful. Above you are only dealing with scarcity, ignoring utility.
>
> There is a deeper utility of Bitcoin than it can be traded for something else. That utility is to use its unforgeable register.
> We have only one kind of units in this register and by having covenants we would create other kinds that are while encumbered not fungible with the common ones.
>
> Units are certainly less desirable if encumbered with a debt covenant. You say no one would assign them any value.
>
> I am not that sure as they still offer the utility of using the unforgeable register, in this case a register of debt covered by reserves.
> You also doubt forcing debt to be covered by reserves is a good idea, I got that, but suppose we do not discuss this here.
> If there are people who think it is a good idea, then they would find having an unforgeable register of it useful and therefore units needed to maintain that register valuable to some extent.
>
>>
>>> I think you do not show the neccesary respect of the market.
>>
>> I’m not sure what is meant here by respect, or how much of it is necessary. I am merely explaining the market.
>>
>
> You are not explaining an existing market but claim that market that is not yet there will follow your arguments.
>
>>> Your rant reminds me of renowed economists who still argue final control Bitcoin can not have value, you do the same proclaiming that temporary control of Bitcoin can not have value.
>>
>> It seems to me you have reversed the meaning of temporary and final. Bitcoin is useful because of the presumption that there is no finality of control. One presumes an ability to trade control of it for something else. This is temporary control. Final control would be the case in which, at some point, it can no longer be traded, making it worthless at that point. If this is known to be the case it implies that it it worthless at all prior points as well.
>>
>> These are distinct scenarios. The fact that temporary (in my usage) control implies the possibility of value does not imply that finality of control does as well. The fact that (renowned or otherwise) people have made errors does not imply that I am making an error. These are both non-sequiturs.
>>
>>> I say, that temporary control does not have value until means dealing with it are offered, and that is I work on. Thereafter might obtain value if final control is deemed too expensive or not attainable, we shall see.
>>
>> The analogy to rental of a consumable good does not apply to the case of a non-consumable good. If it cannot be traded and cannot be consumed it cannot obtain marketable value. To this point it matters not whether it exists.
>>
>
> I meant with control the control of entries in the register which I think is the deeper utility of Bitcoin. Final control is meant to be the opposite of temporary which is the time limited control with some expiry.
>
> Thank you for your thoughts as they help to sharpen my arguments.
>
> Best,
>
> Tamas Blummer
>
>> Best,
>> Eric
>>
>>> Tamas Blummer
>>>
>>>
>