Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2014-12-29 📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED ...
📅 Original date posted:2014-12-29
📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
A big one is the privacy is way too good: every DNS request goes through multiple levels of caching and indirection, so there's no way to figure out who made the request to subject them additional targeting.
A connection-oriented protocol gets rid of all those protections, giving us seed operators monetisation opportunities like selling usage statistics, per-client targeted results, etc. We recently got rid of all the "call-home" functionality that previously gave this type of insight; a connecyion-oriented seed protocol gives us this right back.
There's also this pesky problem of ISP's censoring DNS results with dumb automated systems to block malware - easily fixed with Gregory Maxwell's suggestion of permuting the results with XOR - but that kind of end-user driven solution really misses out in the needs of other Bitcoin stakeholders like law enforcement and marketing companies.
On 29 December 2014 09:47:29 CET, Thomas Zander <thomas at thomaszander.se> wrote:
>On Sunday 28. December 2014 18.25.29 Mike Hearn wrote:
>> Lately we have been bumping up against the limitations of DNS as a
>protocol
>> for learning about the p2p network.
>
>Can you explain further where limitations and problems were hit?
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=dRuK
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📝 Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
A big one is the privacy is way too good: every DNS request goes through multiple levels of caching and indirection, so there's no way to figure out who made the request to subject them additional targeting.
A connection-oriented protocol gets rid of all those protections, giving us seed operators monetisation opportunities like selling usage statistics, per-client targeted results, etc. We recently got rid of all the "call-home" functionality that previously gave this type of insight; a connecyion-oriented seed protocol gives us this right back.
There's also this pesky problem of ISP's censoring DNS results with dumb automated systems to block malware - easily fixed with Gregory Maxwell's suggestion of permuting the results with XOR - but that kind of end-user driven solution really misses out in the needs of other Bitcoin stakeholders like law enforcement and marketing companies.
On 29 December 2014 09:47:29 CET, Thomas Zander <thomas at thomaszander.se> wrote:
>On Sunday 28. December 2014 18.25.29 Mike Hearn wrote:
>> Lately we have been bumping up against the limitations of DNS as a
>protocol
>> for learning about the p2p network.
>
>Can you explain further where limitations and problems were hit?
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HhOT
=dRuK
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