Tom Harding [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-09-19 📝 Original message:On 9/19/2016 10:56 AM, ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-09-19
📝 Original message:On 9/19/2016 10:56 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> I should state that assumption more clearly.
Glad to get you thinking, and I need to change my suggestion. The
catch-up formula is not applicable because it doesn't limit how long the
dishonest miners have to catch up.
Instead you want the probability that the honest miners can build a
chain N blocks long before the dishonest miners do the same, which is
CDF[Erlang(N, q) - Erlang(N, 1 - q), 0]
I have some apparatus for doing this numerically without simulation if
you're interested.
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📝 Original message:On 9/19/2016 10:56 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> I should state that assumption more clearly.
Glad to get you thinking, and I need to change my suggestion. The
catch-up formula is not applicable because it doesn't limit how long the
dishonest miners have to catch up.
Instead you want the probability that the honest miners can build a
chain N blocks long before the dishonest miners do the same, which is
CDF[Erlang(N, q) - Erlang(N, 1 - q), 0]
I have some apparatus for doing this numerically without simulation if
you're interested.
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