tank on Nostr: Advanced data protection doesn’t encrypt iCloud key-value-store only certain app ...
Advanced data protection doesn’t encrypt iCloud key-value-store only certain app data that use the new CloudKit apis: https://support.apple.com/en-al/102651
The BitKey whitepaper does point out that a government adversary can steal user funds in this case with access to iCloud/GDrive and a legal request to Block (disabling delay and notify).
FWIW I agree funds are safer likely from loss/theft for most users with Block and a trusted contact’s Apple/Google cloud storage (especially compared to the threat of getting a Coinbase account SIM swapped).
I’m just wondering how to describe the trust model with social recovery activated in plain english.
The BitKey whitepaper does point out that a government adversary can steal user funds in this case with access to iCloud/GDrive and a legal request to Block (disabling delay and notify).
FWIW I agree funds are safer likely from loss/theft for most users with Block and a trusted contact’s Apple/Google cloud storage (especially compared to the threat of getting a Coinbase account SIM swapped).
I’m just wondering how to describe the trust model with social recovery activated in plain english.