Redish Lab on Nostr: npub19d9p0…kf02p npub1jzgxd…ehc3a npub13hnp9…0fzrs This all gets easier if we ...
npub19d9p04u4xfysdy92fycw947jrca3xve2gnsauysshzewxvmz8dms6kf02p (npub19d9…f02p) npub1jzgxd3ylxrpqcr90zss3ttyuk20cr6y9r7ewz2hyauvr4n0xzs8sqehc3a (npub1jzg…hc3a) npub13hnp9glxqhhu0hk0ee2r2nxkgfj0xgxjlgmtk4tp6edn7f08762s70fzrs (npub13hn…fzrs)
This all gets easier if we accept that we can't measure introspection and shift instead to an action perspective. At that point, someone expressing "I remember yesterday" or "I see red" is taking a vocal action. So now, when we talk memory, we have to talk about it in the shape of how the memory affects the action.
The question now is how does the information process change under vocal actions that appear as "conscious" and vocal (or other) actions that don't.
A very interesting consciousness perspective (comparing vocal actions of perception vs not) is as second-order representation and attention to self as an explanatory process evolved to understand others' actions turned on oneself. (q.v. Michael Graziano's work on this.)
PS. Also, there are a host of consciousness hypotheses that argued for consciousness as a post-hoc monitoring process rather than a present moment action process. (Jeffrey Gray's book for example.) It's an interesting perspective that argues very much against the moment-by-moment process. Translating this into an action perspective moves the "consciousness" of memory into a longer term question of correcting errors and strategy controls.
PS. We need to be very clear what aspects of consciousness we are talking about. Philosophy tends to mix the perceptual recognition of qualia with the ability to explicitly plan an outcome and logical reasoning as a single thing called being "conscious", but those are three very different processes.
Hmmm. Actually, now I wonder if there are any known shared properties between them. I'm going to have to think on that.
This all gets easier if we accept that we can't measure introspection and shift instead to an action perspective. At that point, someone expressing "I remember yesterday" or "I see red" is taking a vocal action. So now, when we talk memory, we have to talk about it in the shape of how the memory affects the action.
The question now is how does the information process change under vocal actions that appear as "conscious" and vocal (or other) actions that don't.
A very interesting consciousness perspective (comparing vocal actions of perception vs not) is as second-order representation and attention to self as an explanatory process evolved to understand others' actions turned on oneself. (q.v. Michael Graziano's work on this.)
PS. Also, there are a host of consciousness hypotheses that argued for consciousness as a post-hoc monitoring process rather than a present moment action process. (Jeffrey Gray's book for example.) It's an interesting perspective that argues very much against the moment-by-moment process. Translating this into an action perspective moves the "consciousness" of memory into a longer term question of correcting errors and strategy controls.
PS. We need to be very clear what aspects of consciousness we are talking about. Philosophy tends to mix the perceptual recognition of qualia with the ability to explicitly plan an outcome and logical reasoning as a single thing called being "conscious", but those are three very different processes.
Hmmm. Actually, now I wonder if there are any known shared properties between them. I'm going to have to think on that.