Cameron Garnham [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: š Original date posted:2017-04-15 š Original message:Thank-you for your prompt ...
š
Original date posted:2017-04-15
š Original message:Thank-you for your prompt response,
I believe I must have a different prospective of Bitcoin to you. Ideologically I donāt agree that miners can be passive participants in the Bitcoin Network; and I certainly donāt see them acting as passive participants in the Bitcoin Community now.
The miners are very much political actors. Hence why I fail to take-to-heart your concern "that the proposal will reject the blocks of passive participantsā.
With AsicBoost, there are three miner groups: Those who use it (and have legal sanction to do so); Those who use it (without legal sanction); and those who donāt use it. If SegWit didnāt directly affect miners, then one could possibly claim that there could be an ideal passive participant miner in reality. However since your important revelations on AsicBoost: SegWit cannot be a āpassiveā option for miners.
Hence, I donāt care about orphaning the blocks of of the theoretical "passive participantā miner. As I have no logical reasoning to suggest one could exists; and a large amount of evidence to suggesting one dose not exit.
On BIP 16 vs. BIP 17; I cannot see how BIP 148 similar engineering tradeoffs. Is there any long-term ātechnical debtā from BIP 148 that Iām unaware of that could be similar to BIP 16?
On the Drama: Well 100M USD p/a can pay for lots of Drama; Hence going back to the first point: The miners are not passive participants when it comes to *any* form of activation of SegWit.
Cameron.
> On 15 Apr 2017, at 10:04 AM, Gregory Maxwell <greg at xiph.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 6:28 AM, Cameron Garnham <da2ce7 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> As many may remember, there was quite some controversy about the BIP16 vs BIP 17 split; the main argument for BIP16 was the urgency of P2SH, and how this was the already ātested and proven to workā solution.
>
> And as a result we ultimately got a clearly inferior solution (520
> byte script limit; 80-bit security; months of orphaned blocks-- and
> two of those were not issues in BIP17). I went along for the cram
> fest on 16 after 12 caught fire, and I was mistaken to do so.
>
> Doubly so because it took years for P2SH to achieve any kind of mass
> deployment due to issues far away from consensus. An extra two months
> spent on some ground-work (including communications and documentation)
> could have pulled forward practical deployment by a year and given
> time to find and fix some of the flaws in the design of P2SH.
>
>> BIP 148 is out (our?) terms of peace. The Bitcoin Community is tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly. BIP 148 proves a outlet, and in Maxwell words: ā...almost guarantees at a minor level of disruption.ā.
>
> It seems I lost a word in my comment: that should have been "almost
> guarantees at _least_ a minor level of disruption". A minor level of
> disruption is the _minimum_ amount of disruption, and for no good
> reason except an unprecedented and unjustified level of haste.
>
> Considering that you did not spare a single word about the specific
> property that I am concerned about-- that the proposal will reject the
> blocks of passive participants, due to avoidable design limitations--
> I can't help but feel that you don't even care to understand the
> concern I was bringing up. :(
>
> How many people barely reviewed the specifics of the proposal simply
> because they want something fast and this proposal does something
> fast?
>
>> tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly
>
> By now competitors and opponents to Bitcoin have surely realized that
> they can attack Bitcoin by stirring up drama.
>
> As a result, the only way that we will ever be free from "war" is if
> we choose to not let it impact us as much as possible. We must be
> imperturbable and continue working at the same level of excellence as
> if virtual shells weren't flying overhead-- or otherwise there is an
> incentive to keep them flying 24/7. Internet drama is remarkably cheap
> to generate. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself".
>
> The alternative is that we hand opponents a ready made formula for
> disruption: astroturf enough drama up that Bitcoiners "sacrifice
> correctness" themselves right off a cliff in a futile attempt to make
> it go away. :)
š Original message:Thank-you for your prompt response,
I believe I must have a different prospective of Bitcoin to you. Ideologically I donāt agree that miners can be passive participants in the Bitcoin Network; and I certainly donāt see them acting as passive participants in the Bitcoin Community now.
The miners are very much political actors. Hence why I fail to take-to-heart your concern "that the proposal will reject the blocks of passive participantsā.
With AsicBoost, there are three miner groups: Those who use it (and have legal sanction to do so); Those who use it (without legal sanction); and those who donāt use it. If SegWit didnāt directly affect miners, then one could possibly claim that there could be an ideal passive participant miner in reality. However since your important revelations on AsicBoost: SegWit cannot be a āpassiveā option for miners.
Hence, I donāt care about orphaning the blocks of of the theoretical "passive participantā miner. As I have no logical reasoning to suggest one could exists; and a large amount of evidence to suggesting one dose not exit.
On BIP 16 vs. BIP 17; I cannot see how BIP 148 similar engineering tradeoffs. Is there any long-term ātechnical debtā from BIP 148 that Iām unaware of that could be similar to BIP 16?
On the Drama: Well 100M USD p/a can pay for lots of Drama; Hence going back to the first point: The miners are not passive participants when it comes to *any* form of activation of SegWit.
Cameron.
> On 15 Apr 2017, at 10:04 AM, Gregory Maxwell <greg at xiph.org> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 6:28 AM, Cameron Garnham <da2ce7 at gmail.com> wrote:
>> As many may remember, there was quite some controversy about the BIP16 vs BIP 17 split; the main argument for BIP16 was the urgency of P2SH, and how this was the already ātested and proven to workā solution.
>
> And as a result we ultimately got a clearly inferior solution (520
> byte script limit; 80-bit security; months of orphaned blocks-- and
> two of those were not issues in BIP17). I went along for the cram
> fest on 16 after 12 caught fire, and I was mistaken to do so.
>
> Doubly so because it took years for P2SH to achieve any kind of mass
> deployment due to issues far away from consensus. An extra two months
> spent on some ground-work (including communications and documentation)
> could have pulled forward practical deployment by a year and given
> time to find and fix some of the flaws in the design of P2SH.
>
>> BIP 148 is out (our?) terms of peace. The Bitcoin Community is tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly. BIP 148 proves a outlet, and in Maxwell words: ā...almost guarantees at a minor level of disruption.ā.
>
> It seems I lost a word in my comment: that should have been "almost
> guarantees at _least_ a minor level of disruption". A minor level of
> disruption is the _minimum_ amount of disruption, and for no good
> reason except an unprecedented and unjustified level of haste.
>
> Considering that you did not spare a single word about the specific
> property that I am concerned about-- that the proposal will reject the
> blocks of passive participants, due to avoidable design limitations--
> I can't help but feel that you don't even care to understand the
> concern I was bringing up. :(
>
> How many people barely reviewed the specifics of the proposal simply
> because they want something fast and this proposal does something
> fast?
>
>> tired-to-death of this war and wants a resolution swiftly
>
> By now competitors and opponents to Bitcoin have surely realized that
> they can attack Bitcoin by stirring up drama.
>
> As a result, the only way that we will ever be free from "war" is if
> we choose to not let it impact us as much as possible. We must be
> imperturbable and continue working at the same level of excellence as
> if virtual shells weren't flying overhead-- or otherwise there is an
> incentive to keep them flying 24/7. Internet drama is remarkably cheap
> to generate. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself".
>
> The alternative is that we hand opponents a ready made formula for
> disruption: astroturf enough drama up that Bitcoiners "sacrifice
> correctness" themselves right off a cliff in a futile attempt to make
> it go away. :)