constant on Nostr: I would add that this 'unlimited time' thing is cheating, and therefore makes it ...
I would add that this 'unlimited time' thing is cheating, and therefore makes it practically wrong. And i don't mean in terms that using infinity is always cheating, but in terms of trust decay.
I am also not making a data availability argument, but one of distance in social graph:
Data is meaningless, in order for it to be information you need context. The immediate context to events is the signature, which brings us into this whole WoT thing. Problem is that signatures run under an underlying assumption that the privatekey is indeed private and therefor the wielder of a name is consistent.
The problem is not getting data anymore, in the 'dead internet TM' context the problem almost completely shifts to getting 'real' data. Relying fundementally on both the key assumption on the one hand, and WoT on the other, distance in socialgraph but also distance in time becomes an issue in a similar way:
It is more realistic to assume that keys will eventually get compromised in their lifetime than not. Therefor if we imagine a let say 100 year timeline (which compared to 'infinity' is not all that much right?), we have generational distance to old notes and their associated keypairs. My point is that because of integrity insecurity, you get a similar type of trust removal as if those keys were distant from your social graph.
In other words: yes, on this 'infinite timeline' you can have all the data, but for the most part means you have all the noise; and its that same time component that undermines your ability to differentiate signal from noise. Time is actually undermining your efforts is my point.
This is also why i keep on hammering on the use of NIP-03 opentimestamps, which somewhat mitigates all of this
I am also not making a data availability argument, but one of distance in social graph:
Data is meaningless, in order for it to be information you need context. The immediate context to events is the signature, which brings us into this whole WoT thing. Problem is that signatures run under an underlying assumption that the privatekey is indeed private and therefor the wielder of a name is consistent.
The problem is not getting data anymore, in the 'dead internet TM' context the problem almost completely shifts to getting 'real' data. Relying fundementally on both the key assumption on the one hand, and WoT on the other, distance in socialgraph but also distance in time becomes an issue in a similar way:
It is more realistic to assume that keys will eventually get compromised in their lifetime than not. Therefor if we imagine a let say 100 year timeline (which compared to 'infinity' is not all that much right?), we have generational distance to old notes and their associated keypairs. My point is that because of integrity insecurity, you get a similar type of trust removal as if those keys were distant from your social graph.
In other words: yes, on this 'infinite timeline' you can have all the data, but for the most part means you have all the noise; and its that same time component that undermines your ability to differentiate signal from noise. Time is actually undermining your efforts is my point.
This is also why i keep on hammering on the use of NIP-03 opentimestamps, which somewhat mitigates all of this