Natanael [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12 📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12
📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev "Mike Hearn" <mike at plan99.net>:
>
> The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
"double spend this" button, to make the scheme work the dishonest miners
must create and distribute such a wallet that implements the whole
scorched-earth protocol. At that point it's easy for miners to reward the
payment fraudster with some of the stolen money the merchant lost, meaning
it now makes sense for the fraudster to always do this. The situation isn't
stable at all.
>
> The second is that it incentivises competitors to engage in payment fraud
against each other. A big rich coffee shop chain that is facing competition
from a small, scrappy newcomer can simply walk into the new shop and buy
things, then trigger the "scorched earth". Even with no miner
collaboration, this means the big company is down the cost of the product
but so is the little company who lost everything. Whoever can outspend the
other wins.
>
> We don't really need game theory to tell us that this plan is a bad idea.
Just imagine trying to explain it to an actual shop keeper. They would
think you were crazy. Bitcoin is already a hard enough concept to
understand without throwing into the mix "anyone can burn the money they
gave you after walking out of the shop".
I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the "right" pool!) and miner
collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
Both outcomes pay the miner and thief equally when successful. The merchant
loses in both.
Zero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it can not be
doublespent in the relevant time frame.
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📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev "Mike Hearn" <mike at plan99.net>:
>
> The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
"double spend this" button, to make the scheme work the dishonest miners
must create and distribute such a wallet that implements the whole
scorched-earth protocol. At that point it's easy for miners to reward the
payment fraudster with some of the stolen money the merchant lost, meaning
it now makes sense for the fraudster to always do this. The situation isn't
stable at all.
>
> The second is that it incentivises competitors to engage in payment fraud
against each other. A big rich coffee shop chain that is facing competition
from a small, scrappy newcomer can simply walk into the new shop and buy
things, then trigger the "scorched earth". Even with no miner
collaboration, this means the big company is down the cost of the product
but so is the little company who lost everything. Whoever can outspend the
other wins.
>
> We don't really need game theory to tell us that this plan is a bad idea.
Just imagine trying to explain it to an actual shop keeper. They would
think you were crazy. Bitcoin is already a hard enough concept to
understand without throwing into the mix "anyone can burn the money they
gave you after walking out of the shop".
I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the "right" pool!) and miner
collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
Both outcomes pay the miner and thief equally when successful. The merchant
loses in both.
Zero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it can not be
doublespent in the relevant time frame.
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