Gregory Maxwell [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: đź“… Original date posted:2014-06-06 đź“ť Original message:On Fri, Jun 6, 2014 at ...
đź“… Original date posted:2014-06-06
đź“ť Original message:On Fri, Jun 6, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> Again, you *don't* have to use brute-force prefix selection. You can
> just as easily give your peer multiple prefixes, each of which
> corresponds at least one address in your wallet with some false positive
> rate. I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data
> privacy writeup months ago.
I'm not trying to pick nits about all the options, I just found it
surprising that you were saying that data published in a super public
manner is no different than something used between nodes.
> I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data privacy writeup months ago.
Communication is a two way street, Adam and I (and others) are
earnestly trying— that we're not following your arguments may be a
suggestion that they need to be communicated somewhat differently.
I'm still failing to see the usefulness of having any prefix filtering
for DH-private outputs. It really complicates the security story— in
particular you don't know _now_ what activities will turn your prior
information leaks into compromising ones retrospectivelly, and doesn't
seem at very necessary for scanning performance.
đź“ť Original message:On Fri, Jun 6, 2014 at 10:05 AM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> Again, you *don't* have to use brute-force prefix selection. You can
> just as easily give your peer multiple prefixes, each of which
> corresponds at least one address in your wallet with some false positive
> rate. I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data
> privacy writeup months ago.
I'm not trying to pick nits about all the options, I just found it
surprising that you were saying that data published in a super public
manner is no different than something used between nodes.
> I explained all this in detail in my original blockchain data privacy writeup months ago.
Communication is a two way street, Adam and I (and others) are
earnestly trying— that we're not following your arguments may be a
suggestion that they need to be communicated somewhat differently.
I'm still failing to see the usefulness of having any prefix filtering
for DH-private outputs. It really complicates the security story— in
particular you don't know _now_ what activities will turn your prior
information leaks into compromising ones retrospectivelly, and doesn't
seem at very necessary for scanning performance.