ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-12-01 📝 Original message: Good morning Antoine, > ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-12-01
📝 Original message:
Good morning Antoine,
> About secondary-markets, the credentials themselves are subject to the classic double-spend problem. E.g, Alice can transfer her "Ned" credentials both to Bob and Caroll, without any of them getting knowledge of the duplication. So it could be expected secondary markets to only happen between LSP and their spokes (where "trust" relationships already exist), as such harder to formalize.
If this is a problem, would the use of the WabiSabi technique help?
If my understanding was correct, the WabiSabi paper described a Chaumian bank that issues coins of variable amount, with clients able to merge and split coins without revealing the amount to the bank/issuer, while allowing for non-double-spendable transfer of coins by having the bank sign off on all transfers between clients (without the bank becoming aware of the value being transferred or the pseudonyms of either client).
If transfer of tokens can be made non-double-spendable, then it may be feasible for a forwarding node to accept tokens issued by a different forwarding node, if the sender also transfers control of those tokens to the forwarding node.
i.e. if a sender has credentials for node A but needs to forward via node B, then node B may be willing to accept credentials issued by node A.
This is similar to the situation where "free banks", in the absence of a central bank, are willing to accept paper bearer bonds issued by another bank, as this lets them attack the other bank by withdrawing the value backing the bond and attempt to trigger a bank run on that other bank (and thus remove them from competition).
Similarly, node B who is a competitor of node A may be willing to accept credentials issued by node A, in a forward that goes through node B, as the transferred credentials would allow node B to perform a jamming attack on node A (and thus remove them from competition).
Both node A and B can then peacefully resolve the difference without attacking via a "clearing house" where they reveal how much of the credential issued by the other they have, in much the same way as free banks would resolve paper bearer bonds.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
📝 Original message:
Good morning Antoine,
> About secondary-markets, the credentials themselves are subject to the classic double-spend problem. E.g, Alice can transfer her "Ned" credentials both to Bob and Caroll, without any of them getting knowledge of the duplication. So it could be expected secondary markets to only happen between LSP and their spokes (where "trust" relationships already exist), as such harder to formalize.
If this is a problem, would the use of the WabiSabi technique help?
If my understanding was correct, the WabiSabi paper described a Chaumian bank that issues coins of variable amount, with clients able to merge and split coins without revealing the amount to the bank/issuer, while allowing for non-double-spendable transfer of coins by having the bank sign off on all transfers between clients (without the bank becoming aware of the value being transferred or the pseudonyms of either client).
If transfer of tokens can be made non-double-spendable, then it may be feasible for a forwarding node to accept tokens issued by a different forwarding node, if the sender also transfers control of those tokens to the forwarding node.
i.e. if a sender has credentials for node A but needs to forward via node B, then node B may be willing to accept credentials issued by node A.
This is similar to the situation where "free banks", in the absence of a central bank, are willing to accept paper bearer bonds issued by another bank, as this lets them attack the other bank by withdrawing the value backing the bond and attempt to trigger a bank run on that other bank (and thus remove them from competition).
Similarly, node B who is a competitor of node A may be willing to accept credentials issued by node A, in a forward that goes through node B, as the transferred credentials would allow node B to perform a jamming attack on node A (and thus remove them from competition).
Both node A and B can then peacefully resolve the difference without attacking via a "clearing house" where they reveal how much of the credential issued by the other they have, in much the same way as free banks would resolve paper bearer bonds.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj