SeedSigner on Nostr: We don't have a PR budget or a marketing department, so it's up to me and our users ...
We don't have a PR budget or a marketing department, so it's up to me and our users to refute false claims made by established, or aspiring, hardware wallet makers.
If I have not been as clear on this as I could have been, or emphasized it enough: Our model has not changed since the outset of the project. Our software intentionally runs on simple, inexpensive, widely available commodity hardware with no software authenticity mechanisms.
This means that our users are responsible for verifying the integrity of the code they run on their SeedSigner, because you can run any code that you would want to on the device (with great power comes great responsibility). If maliciously modified software is run on a signer, there are exploits that can be attempted. Dark skippy is an optimization of an already known attack approach, but does not expose any new fundamental weakness to our approach to cold storage. If users verify they are running our released code (which is a quick and simple process) our security model remains robust and one that myself and all of our contributors fully stand behind.
Instructions to verify our releases are available in the repo, and if you haven't used your signer in a while, or if you have any concerns about who has had access to it, just re-verify and re-deploy our software and you are all set.
I will continue to beat the drum about this as best I can. Our L1 storage model is by design intended to be as trustless and permissionless as possible, for those who want to minimize their reliance on or trust in third parties, and also as a fallback for people in parts of the world where hardware wallets are unavailable or the attempted acquisition of them could come with personal risk.
If you love bitcoin and love freedom, even though our project may not be your preferred approach to cold storage, you should want SeedSigner and projects similar to it to not only exist, but to grow and flourish.
If I have not been as clear on this as I could have been, or emphasized it enough: Our model has not changed since the outset of the project. Our software intentionally runs on simple, inexpensive, widely available commodity hardware with no software authenticity mechanisms.
This means that our users are responsible for verifying the integrity of the code they run on their SeedSigner, because you can run any code that you would want to on the device (with great power comes great responsibility). If maliciously modified software is run on a signer, there are exploits that can be attempted. Dark skippy is an optimization of an already known attack approach, but does not expose any new fundamental weakness to our approach to cold storage. If users verify they are running our released code (which is a quick and simple process) our security model remains robust and one that myself and all of our contributors fully stand behind.
Instructions to verify our releases are available in the repo, and if you haven't used your signer in a while, or if you have any concerns about who has had access to it, just re-verify and re-deploy our software and you are all set.
I will continue to beat the drum about this as best I can. Our L1 storage model is by design intended to be as trustless and permissionless as possible, for those who want to minimize their reliance on or trust in third parties, and also as a fallback for people in parts of the world where hardware wallets are unavailable or the attempted acquisition of them could come with personal risk.
If you love bitcoin and love freedom, even though our project may not be your preferred approach to cold storage, you should want SeedSigner and projects similar to it to not only exist, but to grow and flourish.