Warren Togami Jr. [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2016-01-27 📝 Original message:On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at ...
📅 Original date posted:2016-01-27
📝 Original message:On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 2:12 AM, Luzius Meisser <luzius.meisser at gmail.com>
wrote:
> I agree that flex cap is promising. However, for it to be a viable
> long-term solution, it must not depend on significant block subsidies
> to work as the block subsidy will become less and less relevant over
> time
There is another variant of the Flex Cap approach that allows miners to pay
with a slightly higher difficulty target instead of deferring a portion of
subsidy to later blocks. I think the HK presentation was about the subsidy
deferral variant because of miner feedback that they preferred that
approach.
Myself and a few other developers think proposals like BIP100 where the
block size is subject to a vote by the miners is suboptimal because this
type of vote is costless. You were astute in recognizing in your post it's
a good thing to somehow align the global marginal cost with the miner's
incentive. I feel a costless vote is not great because it aligns only to
the miner's marginal cost, and not the marginal cost to the entire flood
network. Flex Cap is superior as "vote" mechanism as there is an actual
cost associated, allowing block size to grow with actual demand.
Warren
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📝 Original message:On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 2:12 AM, Luzius Meisser <luzius.meisser at gmail.com>
wrote:
> I agree that flex cap is promising. However, for it to be a viable
> long-term solution, it must not depend on significant block subsidies
> to work as the block subsidy will become less and less relevant over
> time
There is another variant of the Flex Cap approach that allows miners to pay
with a slightly higher difficulty target instead of deferring a portion of
subsidy to later blocks. I think the HK presentation was about the subsidy
deferral variant because of miner feedback that they preferred that
approach.
Myself and a few other developers think proposals like BIP100 where the
block size is subject to a vote by the miners is suboptimal because this
type of vote is costless. You were astute in recognizing in your post it's
a good thing to somehow align the global marginal cost with the miner's
incentive. I feel a costless vote is not great because it aligns only to
the miner's marginal cost, and not the marginal cost to the entire flood
network. Flex Cap is superior as "vote" mechanism as there is an actual
cost associated, allowing block size to grow with actual demand.
Warren
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