Jeremy [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2018-02-09 📝 Original message:This might be unpopular ...

📅 Original date posted:2018-02-09
📝 Original message:This might be unpopular because of bad re-org behavior, but I believe the
utility of this construction can be improved if we introduce functionality
that makes a script invalid after a certain time (correct me if I'm wrong,
I believe all current timelocks are valid after a certain time and invalid
before, this is the inverse).

Then you can exclude old delegates by timing/block height arguments, or
even pre-sign delegates for different periods of time (e.g., if this
happens in the next 100 blocks require y, before the next 1000 blocks but
after the first 100 require z, etc).



--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>;

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:58 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 3:56 PM, Ryan Grant <bitcoin-dev at rgrant.org> wrote:
> > Am I reading correctly that this allows unilateral key rotation (to a
> > previously unknown key), without invalidating the interests of other
> > parties in the existing multisig (or even requiring any on-chain
> > transaction), at the cost of storing the signed delegation?
>
> Yes, though I'd avoid the word rotation because as you note it doesn't
> invalidate the interests of any key, the original setup remains able
> to sign. You could allow a new key of yours (plus everyone else) to
> sign, assuming the other parties agree... but the old one could also
> still sign.
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