Alejandro Ranchal Pedrosa [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2018-04-11 📝 Original message: Hi Christian, > That's ...
📅 Original date posted:2018-04-11
📝 Original message:
Hi Christian,
> That's not as bad a tradeoff as people usually interpret, the DMC
> construction has parameters that allow tweaking the number of
> invalidations, and with parameters similar to LN we can have 1.4 billion
> updates. Which is years of operation without need to
> re-anchor. In addition penaltyless invalidation has a number of
> advantages,
As far as I understand, long-lasting DMCs require either:
(a) an initial Refund transaction with a very distant relative
locktime
(b) periodic updates in the form of a Refund transaction pointing
to a new Refund transaction resetting initial the locktime, instead of
actually refunding.
For an extreme case of (a), if one party goes unresponsive and
decides not to sign new commitments then the counterparty in the DMC
will have its funds locked for a significant amount of time, without
penalising the unresponsive party. In the extreme case of (b), either if
as a result of a malicious, unresponsive, or honest participant, each
new refund transaction that resets the refunds may end up hitting the
blockchain, which means the worst-case utility of the channel itself
decreasing due to accumulative blockchain fees. Is this the trade-off
you speak of? if so, can you point at any resource where this trade-off
is tackled to get worst-case utility similar to that of LN channels?
Best,
Alejandro.
📝 Original message:
Hi Christian,
> That's not as bad a tradeoff as people usually interpret, the DMC
> construction has parameters that allow tweaking the number of
> invalidations, and with parameters similar to LN we can have 1.4 billion
> updates. Which is years of operation without need to
> re-anchor. In addition penaltyless invalidation has a number of
> advantages,
As far as I understand, long-lasting DMCs require either:
(a) an initial Refund transaction with a very distant relative
locktime
(b) periodic updates in the form of a Refund transaction pointing
to a new Refund transaction resetting initial the locktime, instead of
actually refunding.
For an extreme case of (a), if one party goes unresponsive and
decides not to sign new commitments then the counterparty in the DMC
will have its funds locked for a significant amount of time, without
penalising the unresponsive party. In the extreme case of (b), either if
as a result of a malicious, unresponsive, or honest participant, each
new refund transaction that resets the refunds may end up hitting the
blockchain, which means the worst-case utility of the channel itself
decreasing due to accumulative blockchain fees. Is this the trade-off
you speak of? if so, can you point at any resource where this trade-off
is tackled to get worst-case utility similar to that of LN channels?
Best,
Alejandro.