Olaoluwa Osuntokun [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2022-04-27 📝 Original message:Hi Jonas, Great work on ...
📅 Original date posted:2022-04-27
📝 Original message:Hi Jonas,
Great work on this BIP! Props to you and the other co-authors for putting
together such an excellent technical specification. I'm sure I'm not the
only developer stoked to see the much anticipated musig2 BIP published!
I made a PR earlier today to add some JSON test vectors [1], which'll make
it easier for other implementations to integrate the existing vectors and
more easily update implementations to account for any updates to the
vectors.
I've been following the BIP for a few months now, and have been updating my
implementation for `btcsuite/btcd` (mostly) in lock step. Admittedly, I miss
the earlier iterations of the BIP that were a bit simpler, but also commend
y'all's approach re specifying more performant (removal of that O(n^2)
loop), safe (the added aux input to nonce generation), and generalized
(support for both normal and x-only tweaks) algorithms.
We've also been integrating my implementation into lnd [2] as well in order
to get more familiar with my proposed API, as well as hands-on experience
crafting real transactions that use musig2 in the wild. There may, or may
not be a few musig2 spends in the main chain today created using our PR ;).
We hope to cut a release next month (lnd v0.15.0) that includes an
experimental API intended to give developers safe access to musig2 signing
and key aggregation. I've also concurrently started working on a proposal
for a new taproot native (taprooty level 1, so step 1 here [6]) LN channel
type that natively uses musig2 where applicable.
While exercising all the different signing combinations on regtest, we
realized that in order to support signing for a key that uses BIP 86
derivation (so commit to an empty root, and only the serialized internal) or
an external key that commits to a tapscript root, an implementation must
make the _pre tweaked_ combined key available to the caller. Without this
key a valid control block proof (in the script path spend case) can't be
constructed. Similarly, for the BIP 86 case, the pre-tweak combined key
needs to be used to apply the top-level taproot tweak.
As is the BIP doesn't touch on this case, which is something any
implementation will need to account for if they wish to support the two
signing modes I mentioned above. In practice, what we do now is compute the
aggregated key, stash that away, _then_ compute the tweaked key, making both
available to the caller [3]. We also add a special case for BIP 86 [5],
since in that case no real tweak needs to be specified, instead an
implementation should compute the BIP 340 tagged hash (tap tweak) of the
pre-tweaked aggregated key and use that as the main tweak.
In both of these cases, we use a special taproot specific options to make
the operations explicit [4] from the caller's PoV. This _does_ mean that an
implementation needs to know how to compute the BIP 341 taproot tweak fwiw.
So ideally any changes to the BIP in this direction can just link out to BIP
341 in place.
Finally, can you elaborate a bit on this fragment of the BIP that describes
a "short cut" when a specific signers is meant to send their nonces last:
> Second, if there is a unique signer who is supposed to send the pubnonce
> last, it is possible to modify nonce generation for this single signer to
> not require high-quality randomness
My reading here is that if there's a signer that will always send their
nonce last (possibly the responder to an LN funding attempt or a server for
a non-custodial service like Loop), then they don't actually need to
generate real randomness, and can just fully specify all the new optional
arguments? If so then this may end up really simplifying the implementation
of certain protocols since that last party doesn't (?) need to worry about
their nonces as long as all the other (?) parties are using strong
randomness?
-- Laolu
[1]: https://github.com/jonasnick/bips/pull/10
[2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/pull/6361
[3]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L320-L331
[4]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L211-L248
[5]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L406-L414
[6]:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-November/003336.html
On Tue, Apr 5, 2022 at 4:04 PM Jonas Nick via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Tim Ruffing, Elliott Jin, and I are working on a MuSig2 BIP that we would
> like
> to propose to the community for discussion. The BIP is compatible with
> BIP340
> public keys and signatures. It supports tweaking, which allows deriving
> BIP32
> child keys from aggregate keys and creating BIP341 Taproot outputs with
> key and
> script paths. You can find the BIP draft at:
> https://github.com/jonasnick/bips/blob/musig2/bip-musig2.mediawiki
>
> The draft is in a state where it should be possible to write an
> implementation
> based on the BIP that passes the basic test vectors (as, e.g.,
> demonstrated by
> [0]). The draft BIP also contains a reference implementation in python.
> Please
> be aware that this is only a draft and that it may still be necessary to
> make
> small tweaks to the algorithms and test vectors.
>
> [0] https://github.com/btcsuite/btcd/pull/1820
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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📝 Original message:Hi Jonas,
Great work on this BIP! Props to you and the other co-authors for putting
together such an excellent technical specification. I'm sure I'm not the
only developer stoked to see the much anticipated musig2 BIP published!
I made a PR earlier today to add some JSON test vectors [1], which'll make
it easier for other implementations to integrate the existing vectors and
more easily update implementations to account for any updates to the
vectors.
I've been following the BIP for a few months now, and have been updating my
implementation for `btcsuite/btcd` (mostly) in lock step. Admittedly, I miss
the earlier iterations of the BIP that were a bit simpler, but also commend
y'all's approach re specifying more performant (removal of that O(n^2)
loop), safe (the added aux input to nonce generation), and generalized
(support for both normal and x-only tweaks) algorithms.
We've also been integrating my implementation into lnd [2] as well in order
to get more familiar with my proposed API, as well as hands-on experience
crafting real transactions that use musig2 in the wild. There may, or may
not be a few musig2 spends in the main chain today created using our PR ;).
We hope to cut a release next month (lnd v0.15.0) that includes an
experimental API intended to give developers safe access to musig2 signing
and key aggregation. I've also concurrently started working on a proposal
for a new taproot native (taprooty level 1, so step 1 here [6]) LN channel
type that natively uses musig2 where applicable.
While exercising all the different signing combinations on regtest, we
realized that in order to support signing for a key that uses BIP 86
derivation (so commit to an empty root, and only the serialized internal) or
an external key that commits to a tapscript root, an implementation must
make the _pre tweaked_ combined key available to the caller. Without this
key a valid control block proof (in the script path spend case) can't be
constructed. Similarly, for the BIP 86 case, the pre-tweak combined key
needs to be used to apply the top-level taproot tweak.
As is the BIP doesn't touch on this case, which is something any
implementation will need to account for if they wish to support the two
signing modes I mentioned above. In practice, what we do now is compute the
aggregated key, stash that away, _then_ compute the tweaked key, making both
available to the caller [3]. We also add a special case for BIP 86 [5],
since in that case no real tweak needs to be specified, instead an
implementation should compute the BIP 340 tagged hash (tap tweak) of the
pre-tweaked aggregated key and use that as the main tweak.
In both of these cases, we use a special taproot specific options to make
the operations explicit [4] from the caller's PoV. This _does_ mean that an
implementation needs to know how to compute the BIP 341 taproot tweak fwiw.
So ideally any changes to the BIP in this direction can just link out to BIP
341 in place.
Finally, can you elaborate a bit on this fragment of the BIP that describes
a "short cut" when a specific signers is meant to send their nonces last:
> Second, if there is a unique signer who is supposed to send the pubnonce
> last, it is possible to modify nonce generation for this single signer to
> not require high-quality randomness
My reading here is that if there's a signer that will always send their
nonce last (possibly the responder to an LN funding attempt or a server for
a non-custodial service like Loop), then they don't actually need to
generate real randomness, and can just fully specify all the new optional
arguments? If so then this may end up really simplifying the implementation
of certain protocols since that last party doesn't (?) need to worry about
their nonces as long as all the other (?) parties are using strong
randomness?
-- Laolu
[1]: https://github.com/jonasnick/bips/pull/10
[2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/pull/6361
[3]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L320-L331
[4]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L211-L248
[5]:
https://github.com/Roasbeef/btcd/blob/afbf14a3a061b961c7fe0d21dcbbc6c941a33027/btcec/schnorr/musig2/keys.go#L406-L414
[6]:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2021-November/003336.html
On Tue, Apr 5, 2022 at 4:04 PM Jonas Nick via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Tim Ruffing, Elliott Jin, and I are working on a MuSig2 BIP that we would
> like
> to propose to the community for discussion. The BIP is compatible with
> BIP340
> public keys and signatures. It supports tweaking, which allows deriving
> BIP32
> child keys from aggregate keys and creating BIP341 Taproot outputs with
> key and
> script paths. You can find the BIP draft at:
> https://github.com/jonasnick/bips/blob/musig2/bip-musig2.mediawiki
>
> The draft is in a state where it should be possible to write an
> implementation
> based on the BIP that passes the basic test vectors (as, e.g.,
> demonstrated by
> [0]). The draft BIP also contains a reference implementation in python.
> Please
> be aware that this is only a draft and that it may still be necessary to
> make
> small tweaks to the algorithms and test vectors.
>
> [0] https://github.com/btcsuite/btcd/pull/1820
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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